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"It is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice
against itself in favor of its citizens as it is to administer the same between
private individuals." Abraham Lincoln.!
In early August 1997, reports surfaced of a police brutality scandal in
New York City. Newspapers across the country reported that Abner
Louima, a Haitian immigrant to the United States, was arrested on
August 9, 1997, and brought to the stationhouse of the 70th Precinct
where New York City Police Department (NYPD) officers took Louima
into the bathroom, beat him severely, and sodomized him with the han-
dle of a plunger. Though a recent study by Amnesty International had
reported an alarming pattern of excessive force by NYPD officers,3 local
authorities predictably refused to recognize that the Louima incident
4might represent something more than an isolated occurrence.
While the Louima case is unique in its brutal detail, similar incidents
involving excessive force occur with disturbing frequency across the na-
tion.' Yet despite the seemingly pervasive nature of the problem, the le-
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missed the report as "short on facts and long on hype." Clyde Haberman, Crossing into a Circle
of the Brutal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1997, at B1.
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gal response to police brutality incidents across the nation has been uni-
formly limited to retrospective relief. The incidents have almost invaria-
bly failed to trigger any response aimed at investigating or reforming the
way the local police department does business.
But in the Louima case, something new happened. On August 18,
1997, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Zachary
Carter, announced the launch of a federal investigation into whether the
Louima case was more than an isolated incident-whether instead it was
a symptom of a pattern in the NYPD "'of failing to take effective action
against officers who are guilty of civil rights violations or otherwise per-
mitting an atmosphere of tolerance for police abuse of authority."'6 If the
investigation were to reveal such a pattern, Carter promised to pursue
appropriate relief under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, a little-known, recently en-
acted civil rights law.7
In launching an investigation of NYPD practices under § 14141, U.S.
Attorney Carter focused national attention for the first time on a law
passed quietly some three years before. When the U.S. Congress passed
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994," most of
the law's provisions-from its Assault Weapons Ban to its promise of
100,000 new beat officers-had been the subject of national headlines.
But passing uncommented upon by the press and undebated by Congress
was Title XXI,9 a provision that greatly augmented the power of the fed-
eral government to fight systematic misconduct within local police de-
partments.
Responding to judicial decisions that had effectively denied victims of
police misconduct standing to pursue proactive relief, Title XXI specifi-
cally authorized the U.S. Attorney General to bring civil actions for equi-
table and declaratory relief against any police department engaged in a
pattern or practice of depriving people of constitutional or statutory
rights.'0 For the first time, Congress invested the Justice Department with
explicit statutory authority to work proactively to change policies and
practices in police departments with records of misconduct.
But if passage of Title XXI, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 14141, clearly
added a potentially potent weapon to the arsenal available to the Justice
Department, whether that weapon will have a significant effect on the
national problem of police brutality is less clear. The effectiveness of the
6. Blaine Harden, Civil Rights Investigation Targets N.Y Police, wAsH. POST, Aug. 19,
1997, at Al (quoting Zachary Carter).
7. See id.
8. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2071 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994 & Supp.
1997)).




law will depend on the answer to a host of questions. How difficult a task
will the Attorney General face in proving a pattern or practice of rights
deprivations under § 14141? Will the Department of Justice obtain and
employ the resources necessary to vigorously enforce the law? Will fed-
eral courts prove willing and able to invest the energy, time, and ingenu-
ity needed to fashion effective equitable relief? If implementation of the
law results in extensive intervention into the administration of local po-
lice departments, would Congress accept such a result?
This Note closely analyzes 42 U.S.C. § 14141 in order to address these
questions. Part I of the Note briefly depicts the legal and social back-
ground which led to the passage of the bill by describing the failure of
traditional legal remedies to deter police brutality and the historic un-
availability of injunctive relief as a remedy in the field. Part I closes by
analyzing the legislative history of § 14141 to gain insight into Congress's
intentions in granting the Attorney General this new authority to pursue
injunctive relief. Part II addresses the text of the law itself, analyzing
what the Attorney General must prove to demonstrate that a police de-
partment has engaged in a pattern or practice of violating rights and what
forms of relief the Attorney General can pursue. Part III turns to the cur-
rent strategy that the Department of Justice has chosen to employ in im-
plementing § 14141, focusing on its resource commitment and legal
strategies. Part IV examines whether federal courts are likely to respond
favorably to structural litigation under §14141. In conclusion, this Note
offers an assessment of the potential impact of the law on the national
problem of police brutality and an analysis of what steps might be taken
to improve the law's operation.
I. THE PROBLEM OF POLICE BRUTALITY AND THE BIRTH OF
42 U.S.C. § 14141
A. The Failure of Traditional Legal Remedies
Studies of the two groups most aware of police practices-residents of
high-crime neighborhoods and police officers themselves-have demon-
strated that the violation of individual rights is a common feature of con-
temporary American policing." Indeed, in 1992, ten urban police chiefs
issued a joint public assessment that "the problem of excessive force in
11, See DAVID H. BAYLEY & HAROLD MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE POLICE 128-
29 (1969); PATE & FRIDELL, supra note 5, at 24 (noting that officers in a small southern city re-
ported that "40 percent of their fellow officers have used excessive force on a prisoner"); James
R. Davis, A Comparison of Attitudes Toward the New York City Police, 17 J. POLICE SCI. &
ADMIN. 233 (1990) (publishing a study in which 25% of a cross-section of Bronx residents re-
ported witnessing police brutality or harassment during arrest).
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American policing is real., 12 Yet despite the relative frequency of police
violations of individual rights, the legal mechanisms that traditionally
control individual behavior harmful to others-criminal and civil law-
have proven conspicuously ineffective at policing the police.
1. The Failure of Criminal Prosecution
Police misconduct will often constitute a violation of common crimi-
nal statutes.3 In addition, the U.S. Congress and many state legislatures
have passed criminal statutes that prohibit a police officer from willfully
interfering with another person's civil rights. 4 Yet criminal prosecutions
of police officers for misconduct in the line of duty are exceedingly rare.
Analysts point to a number of reasons to account for the paucity of
prosecutions. First, evidentiary factors substantially reduce the probabil-
ity of obtaining a conviction. Victims of police misconduct-frequently
convicted felons, criminal suspects, or other marginalized members of so-
ciety-often lack credibility before a jury." If the complainant has cor-
roborating witnesses, they often suffer from the same credibility prob-
lems as the complainant." In many cases, the only witnesses to the
incident are other police officers; the phenomenon of police officers cov-
ering for their colleagues through silence or prevarication is well docu-
mented and apparently widespread. 7 Coupled with the heavy burden of
proof in a criminal case and likely juror identification with the law en-
forcement officer,'8 these evidentiary problems render prosecutions of
police officers difficult to win and thus infrequently brought.
12. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, REPORT at i
(1991) [hereinafter CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION].
13. For example, a policeman's use of excessive force would constitute assault and battery,
or, in its most egregious form, manslaughter or murder.
14. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,242 (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.6 (West 1998).
15. See PEREZ, supra note 5, at 24 (arguing that "[e]xcessive force is used quite often on the
most disenfranchised members of society precisely because of their position in the social order").
Research has revealed that victims of police misconduct are predominantly members of minor-
ity groups, see Edward J. Littlejohn, Civil Liability and the Police Officer: The Need for New
Deterrents to Police Misconduct, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 365, 369 (1981); Alison L. Patton, The
Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 753, 756 n.13 (1993), and are often gays and lesbians, see CHRISTOPHER
COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 168-71; Patton, supra at 756 n.14, or homeless people, see Pat-
ton, supra at 756 n.14. Citing the views of § 1983 practitioners and academics, Patton argues that
juries generally resolve credibility questions in favor of police officers rather than members of
groups traditionally subjected to discrmination. See Patton, supra, at 755-56.
16. See id. at 757.
17. See id. at 763-64; PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAS 51 (1995).
18. See Police Brutality: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 5 (1992) (statement of John R. Dunne, As-
sistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division) [hereinafter Police Brutality Hearings].
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Second, institutional pressures work against local criminal prosecu-
tions. Because of their close working relationship, "prosecutors tend to
be... reluctant to bring charges against police officers, on whom they so
heavily depend as a group."19 Perhaps as a result, local prosecutors' of-
fices traditionally dedicate limited resources to police prosecutions.20 Fi-
nally, in an era in which fear of crime represents a potent political force,
supervisory elected and appointed officials-mayors, district attorneys,
and police commissioners-are unlikely to support criminal prosecution
of police officers in any but the most egregious cases.
While federal prosecutors face less potent political and institutional
pressures, statutory limitations have reduced their ability to step into the
void. Both federal criminal civil rights laws-18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 24221-
require proof not only that a police officer's actions had the effect of de-
priving a victim of civil rights, but also that the officer intended the dep-
rivation.2 In effect, the prosecutor must demonstrate that the officer spe-
cifically intended to use force that the officer knew to be unreasonable.
2
1
This specific intent requirement presents "a significant obstacle" to fed-
eral criminal civil rights prosecutions.
24
The role of federal prosecutors has also been limited by policy deci-
sions.2 The Department of Justice has rejected the notion that its lawyers
are "front line troops in combating instances of police abuses," viewing
its role as "more of a backstop. '26 This policy decision is reflected in the
number of lawyers assigned to civil rights prosecution and the number of
19. HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 176 (1977).
20. See Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The
Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509, 537 (1994).
21. Section 241 prohibits conspiracies to deprive any person of civil rights secured by the
Constitution or U.S. law. See 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994). Section 242 prohibits those acting under
color of law from depriving persons of civil rights secured by the Constitution or U.S. law. See
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
22. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1966) (adopting specific intent re-
quirement under 18 U.S.C. § 241); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945) (adopting
specific intent requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 242).
23. See Levenson, supra note 20, at 556-57. Though there has been some confusion about
what the specific intent requirement actually entails, see Edward F. Malone, Legacy of the Re-
construction: The Vagueness of the Criminal Civil Rights Statutes, 38 UCLA L. REV. 163, 192
(1990), the Supreme Court has ruled that "specific intent" can be inferred when an objective
police officer would find the defendant's acts unreasonable, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 397 (1989). For a critique of the specific intent requirement, see Frederick M. Lawrence,
Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TuL. L.
REv. 2113 (1993).
24. Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need for an Effective Role in Con-
trolling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1455, 1491 (1993); see also Leven-
son, supra note 20, at 556.
25. See David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R-
C.L. L. REV. 465,499 (1992).
26. Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 18, at 3 (statement of John R. Dunne, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division).
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cases brought. Of the 80,747 positions at the Department of Justice in
1991, only forty-four were slated for civil rights prosecution.27 And
though the Department received more than 8000 and investigated more
than 3000 complaints of police misconduct per year in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, federal prosecutors annually pursued indictments in only
about fifty to sixty cases.2
Finally, legal commentators question whether criminal sanctions
could ever "have significance as a deterrent. 9  Our societal desire to
grant police officers the discretion to exercise force, coupled with our in-
ability to define bright-line standards for this practice, diminishes our
willingness to pursue convictions of erring police officers. Put another
way, juries are "understandably reluctan[t] ... to brand as criminal those
who, however misguidedly, are seeking to enforce the law."'"
As a result of these barriers, prosecutions of police officers occur re-
markably infrequently. Between 1981 and 1991 in Los Angeles, the Dis-
trict Attorney brought excessive force prosecutions in forty-three cases-
less than one-quarter of one percent of alleged acts of excessive force."
Federal prosecutors were even less active. The Department of Justice ini-
tiated only three prosecutions against police officers in Los Angeles dur-
ing the same ten-year period. The import of these statistics is clear: the
criminal justice system punishes officers engaging in misconduct so rarely
that it could not be expected to deter potential future offenders.
27. See id. at 321 (supplemental materials submitted by John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division). Since 1985, while the staffing levels at the Department of Jus-
tice have grown by 55 percent, the number of civil rights prosecution positions has declined by 2
percent. See id.
28. See id. at 89; see also JEROME SKOLNICK & JAMES FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE
AND THE ExcEssIvE USE OF FORCE 209 (1993). These statistics became available in 1992 after
the Rodney King incident pursuant to an agreement between the Attorney General and the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee. No up-
dated statistics are available.
29. Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Dam-
age Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 450 (1978); see also PETER
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT at xix (1983).
30. See EGON BITrNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY 38 (1980)
("Our expectation that policemen will use force, coupled by our refusal to state clearly what we
mean by it... smacks of more than a bit of perversity.").
31. Newman, supra note 29, at 450.
32. See Levenson, supra note 20, at 535. The organization Police Watch documented some
of the cases that the L.A. District Attorney's office declined to prosecute; these cases included
alleged assaults "with fists, clubs, flashlights, leather-covered saps, pistol barrels, scalding water
and electric stun gun." Patton, supra note 15, at 796 n.236 (quoting POLICE WATCH, LAW
ENFORCEMENT DATA 3-4 (1991)).
33. See Levenson, supra note 20, at 538 (citing David Freed, Federal Prosecutors Usually
Keep Hands Off, L.A. TIMES, July 7, 1991, at A12).
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2. The Failure of Civil Damages
Because civil law holds plaintiffs to a lesser burden of proof and asks
juries to impose less onerous penalties, individual complainants have had
somewhat more success at winning civil suits for damages against police
officers. The majority of civil suits against police officers are filed in fed-
eral court under § 1983.M However, despite hopes that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
damage awards might provide "an effective deterrent and compensatory
remedy,"3 successes in individual damage claims have yet to translate
into an effective system for controlling police misconduct.
Winning a § 1983 suit against a police officer remains a difficult
proposition. Those on the receiving end of police brutality typically "do
not make sympathetic plaintiffs."36 This problem is exacerbated by the
requirement that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiffs sue the offending police offi-
cer, rather than the officer's municipal employer; 37juries are often reluc-
tant "to impose heavy damage remedies on a hard-working police offi-
cer." s Moreover, even if a § 1983 plaintiff proves the commission of a
constitutional violation, the defendant officer may still avoid liability if he
establishes a reasonable good faith belief in the lawfulness of his ac-
tions.39 Many juries interpret this good faith defense as license to reject
liability if the officer "was doing what he thought was best."40
Section 1983 plaintiffs are also hampered by evidentiary and proce-
dural difficulties, such as corroboration problems, the police "code of si-
lence," and discovery battles to access confidential police documents.4'
Agreements under which prosecutors drop criminal charges in exchange
for promises not to sue the police or the city preempt a potentially large
34. Section 1983 provides a right of action to plaintiffs whose constitutional or statutory
rights are violated by persons acting under color of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). While tort
claims against police officers can also be brought in state court, "the largest number of police
misconduct cases are still brought in federal court [under § 1983] ." MICHAEL AVERY & DAVID
RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION 1-5 (1995).
35. Newman, supra note 29, at 453.
36. Patton, supra note 15, at 756; cf. supra note 15 and accompanying text.
37. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,187-92 (1961).
38. Federal Response to Police Misconduct: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 17 (1992) (statement of
Judge Jon Newman) [hereinafter Police Misconduct Hearings]. In most cases, municipalities
indemnify police officers, but courts refuse to allow plaintiffs to publish this fact to the jury. The
result is the worst of both worlds: juries likely reduce awards based upon ability of officer to
pay, but indemnification reduces the deterrent effect of personal awards. See Newman, supra
note 29, at 455-58.
39. See id. at 459-62. To be more precise, police officers are shielded from liability by quali-
fied immunity unless "a reasonable jury could conclude that the [constitutional violation] is so
apparent that no reasonable officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions." De-
Graff v. District of Columbia, 120 F.3d 298, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1
F.3d 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
40. Police Misconduct Hearings, supra note 38, at 18 (statement of Judge Jon Newman).
41. See Patton, supra note 15, at 761.
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number of prospective suits.42 Add to the mix that § 1983 cases are
costly 3 and that the typical complainant will usually lack the financial re-
sources to retain an attorney,4 and the result is that civil actions against
police officers are rarely successful.
45
Moreover, even sizable plaintiff victories in police misconduct cases
may neither deter police officers from subsequent abusive behavior nor
prompt police departments to alter policies or tactics. Laws across the
country protect individual police officers from paying legal fees or dam-
ages in misconduct cases, transferring liability to the municipality so long
as the officer acted in good faith. 6 In practice, municipalities virtually al-
ways determine that an officer acted in good faith, even if the trial court
explicitly rules that the officer acted with malice.47 As a result, commenta-
tors may not be exaggerating when they argue that "[o]fficers have no
economic incentive to change their behavior since a civil suit has no fi-





Studies show that the outcomes of civil suits have a similarly minimal
impact on many police departments.4' From 1986 to 1990, the years
leading up to the Rodney King incident, the city of Los Angeles paid
damage awards totaling 20 million dollars in excessive force cases alone.
Similarly, New York City paid out 50 million dollars in damages in cases
of "police misconduct" from 1987 to 1992.s' Yet, in each city, the police
department made no institutional or policy changes to respond to these
42. See R. Samuel Paz, Civil Rights Laws: The Need for a New Look at an Old BandAid, 14
CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 20, 24 (1994); see also Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386
(1987) (holding agreements to release § 1983 claims in exchange for dismissal of criminal
charges enforceable).
43. See Paz, supra note 42, at 24 (drawing on experience to argue that § 1983 suits require
at least one expert witness).
44. See Patton, supra note 15, at 756 n.18. Because such cases are difficult to win, few attor-
neys are willing to work on a contingent basis except in the most egregious and/or provable
cases of police misconduct. See id. at 756-57.
45. See Alfredo Garcia, The Scope of Police Immunity from Civil Suit Under Title 42 Sec-
tion 1983 and Bivens: A Realistic Appraisal, 11 WHITIER L. REv. 511,532 (1989) (opining that
"the likelihood of a successful civil action against a police officer is miniscule"); Patton, supra
note 15, at 753-54 (discussing the weakness of § 1983 as a deterrent because of the difficulty of
filing and winning a suit against a police officer).
46. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825 (West 1993).
47. See Patton, supra note 15, at 771-72.
48. Id. at 771.
49. According to the Police Foundation, "many departments [do] not keep information
concerning civil suits." PATE & FRIDELL, supra note 5, at 146.
50. See CHEVIGNY, supra note 17, at 52-53. In addition, between January 1989 and May
1992, L.A. County paid over $15 million for excessive force judgments against the Sheriff's De-
partment. See id. at 53.
51. See id. at 101-02. For the purposes of this statistic, "police misconduct" is defined as all
cases against police officers excluding ordinary negligence such as auto accidents. See id.
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suits. In fact, despite the substantial sums of money involved, neither city
even bothered to monitor civil suits.52
Legal commentators have suggested a host of reforms to endow
§ 1983 with a more powerful punch.53 But recent history in L.A. and New
York suggests that reforming § 1983 to increase the size and power of
damage awards will likely not provide the necessary deterrence to con-
trol police misconduct. In cases involving hot-button issues like crime
control, general deterrence in the form of damages simply may not do the
trick. As one analyst has pointed out, "the political environment may
countenance or even reward lawbreaking that appears to advance impor-
tant programmatic or ideological goals such as crime control."' 4 In pur-
suing crime control at the expense of police misconduct, cities may prove
willing to "pay as they go for the violation of the rights of their people."5'
B. The Historical Unavailability of Injunctive Relief for the Remediation
of Police Misconduct: The Problem of Standing
Traditionally, when confronted with cases in which legal relief is in-
adequate or insufficient to prevent a recurring legal harm, courts have re-
sorted to the equitable remedies of injunction and declaratory judgment.
As discussed above, the history of police misconduct litigation under
§ 1983 presents a case study in the inadequacy of legal remedies. Yet,
courts have not filled the void by issuing injunctions against repeated po-
lice misconduct or by declaring particular police procedures unconstitu-
tional. This absence of injunctive and declaratory relief is no puzzle: it
stems directly from a body of standing jurisprudence that dramatically
limits the availability of such relief in police misconduct cases. The fol-
lowing section will trace the development of this standing doctrine-a
doctrine which § 14141 was designed to circumvent.
52. See id. at 102. After public reports were issued criticizing the ignoring of civil suits, both
the LAPD and the NYPD instituted policies aimed at monitoring civil claims. See id. at 105. It is
telling, however, that these reforms came about not as a result of the economic pressure of civil
damage awards but because of the publicity of high-profile incidents of excessive force.
53. Proposals have included: authorizing the Attorney General to initiate § 1983 suits on
behalf of victims, imposing liability on municipalities rather than individual officers, eliminating
the qualified immunity defense, authorizing unindemnifiable punitive damages against officers
for egregious violations, and authorizing punitive damages against municipalities for ineffective
training and/or complaint management. See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 1518-26; Newman, supra
note 29, at 453-65.
54. SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 125.
55. Rudovsky, supra note 25, at 500; see also Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 18, at 60
(statement of Paul Hoffman, Legal Director, ACLU of Southern California).
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1. The Unavailability of Equitable Relief to Private Litigants
On its face, § 1983 appears to provide "sweeping remed[ies] for offi-
cial misconduct," ranging from damages to equitable relief. 6 For a brief
period in the 1970s, § 1983 plaintiffs successfully pursued injunctive relief
to eliminate unconstitutional police practices and transform police pol-
icy.57 However, a line of Supreme Court cases subsequently erected
nearly insurmountable standing requirements for plaintiffs pursuing equi-
table relief against police departments. As a result, today it is "virtually
impossible for private § 1983 litigants to obtain equitable relief against
patterns or practices of police abuse.""s
The Supreme Court's first foray into the field in Rizzo v. Goode in-
volved the reversal of an injunctive order requiring the city of Philadel-
phia to overhaul its procedure for handling civilian complaints of police
misconduct.59 Though the district court found constitutional violations by
police officers "unacceptably high" in number and too frequent to be
"dismissed as rare, isolated instances,"' ° the Supreme Court ruled that
the plaintiffs lacked "the requisite personal stake in the outcome" to pur-
sue injunctive relief because past exposure to illegal conduct does not
demonstrate a likelihood of future harm." In effect, the Rizzo Court
deemed patterns or practices of constitutional violations insufficient to
invest victims of such violations with standing to sue for injunctive relief;62
instead, the Court apparently required plaintiffs to allege a "deliberate
polic[y]" or an "intentional, concerted, and ... conspiratorial effort."'
56. SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 16.
57. See Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 18, at 171 (statement of Drew Days, Professor,
Yale Law School).
58. Hoffman, supra note 24, at 1513.
59. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
60. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd sub nom. Goode v.
Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
61. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372-73 (internal quotation omitted). The widespread nature of police
misconduct may have worked against the plaintiffs: in pointing out that "there was no showing
that the behavior of the Philadelphia police was different in kind or degree from that which ex-
ists elsewhere," id. at 375, the majority is hinting at its concern that allowing injunctive actions
under § 1983 could precipitate a shift in control of police departments from local governments
to federal courts.
62. Analysts initially questioned whether Rizzo merely resulted from insufficient proof of a
pattern or practice of misconduct. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Effect of the Search for Equality
upon Judicial Institutions, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 795, 803 (1979); Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts
as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 949, 974 (1978). More recently, as dismissals of
suits for injunctive relief against patterns or practices of police misconduct have piled up, com-
mentators have viewed Rizzo as systematically limiting private plaintiffs in police abuse suits to
damage remedies. See Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 18, at 171 (statement of Drew Days,
Professor, Yale Law School).
63. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 374-75.
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In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons," the Supreme Court extended its re-
strictive standing rationale to cases involving unconstitutional police poli-
cies. In overturning a preliminary injunction enjoining the L.A. Police
Department from employing a chokehold that carried a high risk of in-
jury or death," the Lyons Court held that neither the plaintiff's previous
exposure to the chokehold nor the continued existence of a department
policy authorizing its use constituted sufficient threat of future harm to
confer equitable standing on the plaintiff. 66 In the process, Lyons effec-
tively rendered the admittedly unconstitutional policy immune from in-
junction. As Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent, the decision left the
city "free to continue the policy indefinitely as long as it is willing to pay
damages for the injuries and deaths that result. ' '"
With precious few exceptions, plaintiffs have been unable to devise
innovative pleading strategies to circumvent Lyons and Rizzo and estab-
lish standing.69 As a result, Rizzo and Lyons have effectively rendered
injunctive relief against police misconduct virtually unobtainable, even
64. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
65. The preliminary injunction enjoined use of the hold except when an officer was threat-
ened with death or serious injury. It also mandated an improved training program and regular
reporting and record keeping. See id. at 99-100.
66. See id. at 105.
67. See CHEVIGNY, supra note 17, at 109.
68. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 113 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. The few exceptions to this generalization are worth noting. First, Ninth Circuit courts
have allowed plaintiffs who establish standing to seek § 1983 damage remedies against police
officers to pursue injunctive relief. See, e.g., Nava v. City of Dublin, 121 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir.
1997). No other circuit has adopted this minority interpretation of Lyons, and even Ninth Cir-
cuit courts have questioned its validity. See id. at 457. Second, in at least two cases, plaintiffs
seeking injunctions to remedy discriminatory police practices have successfully avoided dis-
missal by bringing claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et
seq. (1994) (proscribing discrimination under programs receiving financial assistance from the
federal government), rather than under § 1983. See Neighborhood Action Coalition v. City of
Canton, 882 F.2d 1012 (6th Cir. 1989) (reversing the dismissal of a § 2000d action seeking in-
junctive relief to force a police department to provide equal police protection to a minority
neighborhood); Chavez v. Illinois State Police, No. 94CV5307, 1996 WL 66136 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
13, 1996) (rejecting motion to dismiss § 2000d action seeking injunctive relief against police
practice of detaining, stopping, and searching individuals on the basis of race). Third, in a num-
ber of cases, plaintiffs pursuing preliminary injunctions under § 1983 against patterns or prac-
tices of police misconduct have satisfied Lyons by successfully pleading a "real and immediate
threat of injury" from police. In Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1993),
the plaintiffs were successful in obtaining standing because of the huge number of incidents and
the localized nature of the alleged misconduct. See id. at 507-08 (involving 75 alleged incidents
within six-by-seven block area). In at least three other cases, plaintiffs have satisfied Lyons by
bringing a class action to enjoin mandatory law enforcement policies. See DeShawn E. v. Safir,
156 F.3d 340 (2d Cir. 1998); LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985); Franklin v. City of
Chicago, 102 F.R.D. 944 (N.D. Ill. 1984). For example, in DeShawn E., a certified class of chil-
dren arrested on delinquency charges convinced the Second Circuit that the likelihood that the
class would suffer harm from the NYPD's mandatory interrogation policy was sufficient to sat-
isfy the Lyons requirement. See DeShawn E., 156 F.3d at 345.
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where the misconduct involves patterns of abuse or unconstitutional offi-
cial policies. °
2. The Unavailability of Injunctive Relief to the Attorney General
Partly in response to the outcome of Rizzo, the Department of Justice
entered into an extensive investigation of the Philadelphia Police De-
partment that revealed widespread officer misconduct and institutional
mismanagement. 7' As a result, the Department of Justice filed suit against
the city of Philadelphia, its police department, and high-ranking munici-
pal officials, alleging both a systematic pattern of constitutional rights
violations by officers and the deliberate encouragement of such viola-
tions through the police department's adoption and retention of inade-
quate disciplinary, complaint review, and training procedures.7 As a
remedy, the Justice Department sought an injunction both against the
rights violations themselves and against the city's failure to correct the
effects and to ensure against recurrence of such violations.7
Arguing that the Attorney General had standing to pursue injunctive
relief against patterns or practices of rights violations under implied
rights of action in the Fourteenth Amendment and the criminal civil
rights statutes,74 the Department of Justice hoped to fill the gap left by
Rizzo's denial of standing to individuals in similar cases." However,
willing neither to read an implied civil fight of action into expressly
criminal statutes nor to grant the executive branch the power to sue local
governments to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment without Congres-
sional authorization, the Third Circuit rejected the Attorney General's
claim of standing and dismissed the case.76
70. See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 1513; Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 18, at 174
(statement of Drew Days, Professor, Yale Law School). Lower courts have applied Lyons to
deny standing to plaintiffs seeking declaratory as well as injunctive relief against allegedly un-
constitutional police policies. See Laura E. Little, It's About Time: Unraveling Standing and Eq-
uitable Ripeness, 41 BUFF. L. Rav. 933, 942 & n.51 (1993) (citing cases from four circuits).
71. See Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 18, at 173 (statement of Drew Days, Professor,
Yale Law School).
72. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187,190 (3d Cir. 1980).
73. See id. The Department of Justice also sought declaratory relief.
74. See id.
75. See Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 18, at 173 (statement of Drew Days, Professor,
Yale Law School).
76. See City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d at 190-202. Similar holdings by federal circuit courts
undermined the Justice Department's pursuit of injunctive relief to vindicate the constitutional
rights of institutionalized persons. See, e.g., United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977). In United States v. Mattson, for
example, the Justice Department sought to enjoin a state-managed mental health institution
from continuing to house mentally retarded individuals in an environment so unsafe and un-
healthy that it violated their constitutional rights. See Mattson, 600 F.2d at 1297. Although the
Ninth Circuit termed the Justice Department's efforts "laudable," id. at 1297, the court held
Vol. 17:149, 1998
Police Brutality
Though the Supreme Court never ruled on the issue, subsequent at-
torneys general apparently viewed the rulings in City of Philadelphia as
determinative;7 the Department of Justice never again attempted to en-
join patterns or practices of rights violations by police or institutional of-
ficials. Like individual victims, the federal government lacked standing to
enjoin police officers' violations of individual rights. As a result, by 1983,
the triumvirate of Rizzo, Lyons, and City of Philadelphia had effectively
removed injunctive relief from the tools available to deter police miscon-
duct. Prior to legislative action,78 legal solutions to the problem of police
brutality consisted merely of a dysfunctional system of criminal liability
and civil damages. It would take a videotape and a riot to spur congres-
sional action.
C. Legislative Background of 42 U.S.C. § 14141
The power of Congress to grant individuals or the Attorney General
standing to pursue injunctive relief in cases involving patterns or prac-
tices of violations of individuals' rights has never been much in doubt.
79
Settled case law confirms Congress's plenary authority to grant standing
to the Attorney General whenever it deems such standing to be in the na-
tional interest.so Whether Congress has the authority to confer standing
upon individuals presents a more complicated question. In its first analy-
sis of the issue, the Supreme Court appeared to acknowledge that Con-
gress held broad authority to confer standing upon individuals.81 Subse-
quent cases, however, have drawn a distinction between prudential
standing rules, which Congress can waive through legislation, and consti-
tutional standing requirements, which are inviolable.8 In Lujan v. De-
that the Department had neither explicit nor implicit statutory authority to bring the case and
thus lacked standing, See id. at 1298-1300.
77. See, e.g., Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 18, at 173 (statement of John R. Dunne,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division) (informing the congressional committee that
D.O.J. lacked authority to pursue injunctive relief against police departments because of City of
Philadelphia).
78. In 1980, Congress overturned Mattson by passing the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act (CRIPA), Pub. L. No. 96-247 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j (1994)), which
granted the Attorney General standing to bring suits for injunctive relief to remedy patterns or
practices of unconstitutional treatment of institutionalized persons.
79. For an extensive discussion of the ability of Congress to grant standing in this area, see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Ju-
risprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 48-56 (1984). While Professor Fallon suggests that
Lyons could be interpreted to imply that "Congress could not authorize injunctive relief based
solely on past injuries," he rejects this interpretation as "unwise if not untenable." Id. at 30.
80. See id. at 54.
81. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (allowing Congress to authorize suits by
individuals by passing "'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing"'
(quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,617 n.3 (1973))).
82. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,100 (1979).
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fenders of Wildlife," the Court attempted to clarify this distinction. Writ-
ing for a plurality, Justice Scalia rejected the idea that Congress could in-
vent injuries in order to satisfy standing requirements but allowed that
Congress could "elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries con-
crete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law." Mean-
while, in a concurrence that provided the deciding votes for the majority,
Justice Kennedy argued that congressional power includes the definition
of injuries to create standing, so long as Congress "at the very least iden-
tif[ies] the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate[s] the injury to the class
of persons entitled to bring suit."'85 Under either framework, a statute that
authorized victims of rights deprivations to enjoin the pattern or practice
of police misconduct that led to those deprivations would create standing
by identifying a concrete, de facto injury, relating that injury to a class of
victims entitled to bring suit, and elevating the status of that injury to
provide standing for equitable relief.
Prior to City of Philadelphia, Congress had repeatedly considered and
rejected the possibility of employing these powers to authorize the At-
torney General to pursue injunctive relief in any case involving a civil
rights violation.86 Instead of a general authorization, Congress repeatedly
elected to grant the Attorney General and individuals standing to pursue
injunctive relief to remedy violations of specific civil rights, such as voting
rights, prisoners' rights, and rights to public accommodations.
Though City of Philadelphia and Lyons had rendered injunctive relief
virtually unavailable in police misconduct cases in the early 1980s, Con-
gress was slow to respond to the challenge. Perhaps due to rising national
concerns over crime, the expansion of police power to fight the war on
drugs, a conservative Republican White House, and the growing antipa-
83. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). At issue in Lujan was the Endangered Species Act's authorization
for "any person" to bring suit to enjoin a violation of the Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A)
(1994).
84. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578; see also Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312,2322 (1997) (rejecting as
unconstitutional Congress's declaration that individual members of Congress had standing to
challenge the Line-Item Veto Act, because they could allege "no injury to themselves as indi-
viduals").
85. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86. This proposal was included in the original versions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and
1964 and offered as an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1960. In each case, however, Con-
gress rejected granting the Attorney General such broad, wide-ranging authority. See United
States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 194-197 (3d Cir. 1980) (chronicling the legislative
history of attempts to grant the Attorney General the authority to pursue injunctive relief under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
87. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1994) (authorizing the Attorney General to pursue in-
junctive relief in cases involving voting rights); 42 U.S.C. § 1997(a) (1994) (authorizing Attor-
ney General to pursue injunctive relief in cases involving civil rights of prisoners); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-3, 2000a-5 (1994) (authorizing Attorney General and individuals to pursue injunctive
relief in cases involving discrimination in public accommodations).
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thy of the Supreme Court towards federal intervention in local govern-
mental administration, the largely Democratic Congress of the 1980s
mounted no serious attempt to pass legislation to counteract Lyons,
Rizzo, and City of Philadelphia by authorizing the pursuit of injunctive
relief to remedy police abuse. But the Rodney King incident and the na-
tional outcry that followed rejuvenated congressional interest in new ap-
proaches to the problem of police brutality.
Within months of the King incident, Representative Don Edwards of
California introduced the Police Accountability Act, which authorized
actions for injunctive relief to remedy police abuse." More specifically,
Edwards's bill prohibited police officers from engaging in a pattern or
practice of conduct that deprived individuals of civil rights; the bill also
authorized both the Attorney General and the victims of such conduct to
"obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pat-
tern or practice. ' 'b9 Responding to popular outrage over the King incident
and renewed national interest in controlling police practices, the Demo-
cratic House leadership of the 102d Congress incorporated the Police
Accountability Act into the House Omnibus Crime Bill of 1991 ("Crime
Bill") as Title XII.90
However, opposition from the Bush Justice Department, potent po-
litical pressure from police groups, and the prospect of a veto by Presi-
dent Bush forced Senate leadership to water down Title XII.91 By the
time the Conference Committee reconciling House and Senate versions
of the bill had completed its work, Title XII authorized only the Attorney
General to sue for injunctive relief. 2 Though the House Judiciary Com-
mittee had termed private standing "necessary, especially in situations
where the Department of Justice does not act," 93 the Conference Com-
mittee dropped the private cause of action. The deletion of individual
standing represented a critical policy decision that will greatly affect the
legislation's implementation. 94
88. See H.R. 2972, 102d Cong. (1991); Don Edwards, Making a Federal Case, THE
RECORDER, Sept. 25, 1991, at 4. The bill also originally included a section increasing criminal
liability for police officers; that section was stricken by the Judiciary Committee. See H.R. REP.
No. 102-242, at 405 (1991).
89. H.R. 2972, 102d Cong. (1991).
90. See H.R. 3371, 102d Cong. (1991); see also H.R. REP. No. 102-1085, at 149-50 (1992)
(describing the incorporation of H.R. 2972 into H.R. 3371).
91. See Terence Moran & Daniel Klaidman, Police Brutality Poses Quandary for Justice
Department, LEGAL TIMES, May 4, 1992, at 1.
92. See H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 102-405, at 223-24 (1991).
93. H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, at 402 (1991).
94. See infra notes 148-176 and accompanying text.
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On November 27, 1991, the House passed the Conference Commit-
tee's compromise bill.95 Yet on account of a veto threat and an ultimately
successful filibuster by Senate Republicans, the Crime Bill never reached
President Bush's desk.96
Defeat of the 1991 Crime Bill merely postponed congressional action
to authorize the pursuit of injunctive relief against police abuses. The ill-
fated 1991 bill provided the starting point for the drafting of the 103rd
Congress's own crime legislation. When Senator Joseph Biden intro-
duced the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993, the
legislation included the 1991 Conference Committee's compromise pro-
vision authorizing the Attorney General to pursue injunctive relief for
patterns of police abuse.97 Though partisan wrangling over other issues
held up passage of the bill until late 1994, the final enacted version of the
Crime Act included this provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141.98
Thus, in response to the unavailability of equitable relief to prevent
police misconduct, Congress expressly authorized the Attorney General
to use civil suits to prevent patterns or practices of civil rights violations
by law enforcement officials. But would the new law prove an effective
tool in preventing police brutality? Because of the law's recent enact-
ment, answers in the form of statistical data and interpretive case law are
unavailable. As a result, this paper will attempt to predict the significance
of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 through textual analysis and examination of the
law's preliminary application.
II. 42 U.S.C. § 14141: A TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
Section 14141 consists of two parts: Subsection (a) which defines and
proscribes the "[u]nlawful conduct," and subsection (b) which assigns the
sole method of enforcing subsection (a). Section 14141(a) declares:
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof...
to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers...
that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.99
95. See 137 CONG. REc. H8173 (daily ed. Nov. 27,1991).
96. See Joan Biskupic, Crime Measure Is a Casualty of Partisan Skirmishing, CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP., Nov. 30, 1991, available in 1991 WL 5333376.
97. See S.1488, 103d Cong. (1993).
98. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XX 108 Stat. 2071 (1994). Title XXI also included a provi-
sion, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14142, that requires the Attorney General to gather and publish
"data about the use of excessive force by law enforcement officers." Id.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a). Section 14141(a)'s prohibition also extends to a pattern or prac-
tice of conduct by "officials or employees of any governmental agency with responsibility for




In order to enforce this prohibition, § 14141(b) provides that
"[w]henever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a
violation of paragraph (1) [sic] has occurred, the Attorney General...
may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief
to eliminate the pattern or practice."
This Note will analyze each subsection individually.
A. Section 14141(a): "Pattern or Practice"
In passing 42 U.S.C. § 14141, Congress's general intent was clear: to
overrule City of Philadelphia and provide the Attorney General with the
authority to "sue a local government or its officials to enjoin violations of
citizens' constitutional rights by police officers."' ° But the procedural and
evidentiary burden that the Attorney General must shoulder in order to
obtain injunctive relief under § 14141 is less obvious. That burden will
depend almost entirely on judicial construction of the phrase "pattern or
practice of conduct by law enforcement officers." Depending upon the
term's construction, proving a "pattern or practice" of police misconduct
could entail anything from extensive evidence of systematic unconstitu-
tional police activities, to evidence of a pernicious police department
policy, to evidence of a handful of similar police actions that violate citi-
zens' rights. To date, no federal court has interpreted the phrase "pattern
or practice" under the two acts that utilize this phrase in the context of
rights deprivations: the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
(CRIPA) and § 14141.
Because § 14141 does not define its terms, the legislative text provides
little guidance as to what Congress meant by a "pattern or practice." In
interpreting an undefined statutory term, the Supreme Court has exam-
ined two sources to determine congressional intent: the statute's legisla-
tive history and previous judicial constructions of similar language in
other statutes.'0 ' Analysis of these two sources provides a number of in-
sights-though no definitive answer-regarding the term's likely defini-
tional scope. The legislative history of § 14141 reveals that a "pattern or
practice" may be inferred from a few individual rights violations, coupled
with an overt institutional police policy of condoning misconduct. And
judicial acceptance of statistical evidence and disparate impact theories to
prove a "pattern or practice" under other statutes strongly suggests that
evidence of repeated, similar rights deprivations will be sufficient proof
of a § 14141. But before launching into an extended examination of these
100. H.R. REP. No. 102-242, at 400 (1991).
101. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16
(1977).
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two sources, it is important to pause and note the traditional judicial re-
luctance to find patterns of police misconduct.
1. The Backdrop to Section 14141: Judicial Reluctance To Find
Patterns of Police Misconduct
Prior to the passage of § 14141, federal courts had proved reluctant to
find patterns of police misconduct. Whether federal courts adopt a less
onerous standard of proof in "pattern or practice" cases brought under
§ 14141 may in large part determine its efficacy at limiting police miscon-
duct.
In order to obtain supervisory or municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, plaintiffs must prove the existence either of an institutional
"policy" authorizing misconduct or of a police "custom" of misconduct,
defined as a "continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitu-
tional misconduct by the government entity's employees" that policy-
making officials ignored." 2 Not surprisingly given this onerous standard
of proof, few plaintiffs have successfully demonstrated a police "custom"
of constitutional deprivations. 3 As a result, "the only defendant realisti-
cally subject to suit is the subordinate state official directly responsible
for violating the plaintiff's rights."'' However, § 1983 case law will not
bind courts interpreting § 14141. To the contrary, the congressional deci-
sion to use the term "pattern or practice" in § 14141 rather than to adopt
the term "custom" from § 1983 case law-as well as the absence of the
limiting adjectives "continuing," "widespread," and "persistent"-
suggests that proving a "pattern or practice" of police misconduct will be
easier under § 14141 than under § 1983.
In Rizzo v. Goode, the only Supreme Court case involving an alleged
pattern of police misconduct, the Court acknowledged that at least 16 in-
cidents in which officers violated citizens' constitutional rights occurred
in Philadelphia in the space of a year."°5 And the Rizzo Court did not dis-
pute the lower court's finding that departmental procedures
"discourage[d] the filing of civilian complaints and... minimize[d] the
consequences of police misconduct.""' In reversing the lower court find-
ings of a judicially cognizable pattern of police misconduct, the Rizzo
Court downplayed the number of incidents as only "some 20 in all occur-
102. Thelma D. v. Board of Educ., 934 F.2d 929,932-33 (8th Cir. 1991).
103. See Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 147, 150
(arguing that courts have "been fairly consistent in allowing supervisors to escape liability for
their subordinates' constitutional wrongs").
104. Id. at 185.
105. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,367-68 (1976).
106. Id. at 368-69.
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ring at large in a city of some three million inhabitants, with 7,500 po-
licemen."107 Moreover, the Court rejected "invocation of the word
'pattern' in a case where.., the defendants are not causally linked to
it."108
While its discussion of the word "pattern" demonstrates the Rizzo
Court's reluctance to question police practices, it carries little preceden-
tial weight over § 14141 cases. The Rizzo Court was interpreting § 1983
rather than "pattern or practice" legislation like § 14141. Moreover,
§ 14141 provides the link between incidents of police misconduct and
governmental defendants that the Court found missing in Rizzo. Section
14141 prohibits not only law enforcement officers but also "any govern-
mental authority" from engaging in a pattern of conduct that violates
constitutional rights. However, despite these distinctions, if the general
tenor of the Rizzo decision-particularly its rather cavalier dismissal of
twenty similar constitutional violations within one year-carries over, the
current Supreme Court may not interpret § 14141 as broadly as its pro-
ponents hope.
2. Legislative History
A better sense of what level of evidence will be required emerges
from § 14141's legislative history. While the direct legislative history of
§ 14141 is virtually non-existent,' 9 the House Judiciary Committee Re-
port on the 1991 Crime Bill discusses § 14141's predecessor bill exten-
sively.1 Though the previous bill included a more expansive enforce-
ment section that authorized private parties, as well as the Attorney
General, to seek injunctive relief, its prohibition section contained lan-
guage identical to § 14141, declaring unlawful a pattern or practice of
rights-depriving conduct by law enforcement officials."' As a result, the
1991 committee reports analyzing § 14141's predecessor bill are compel-
ling evidence of congressional intent regarding the meaning of "pattern
or practice" in § 14141.1
107. Id. at 373.
108. Id. at 375. It is unclear what bearing the Court's interpretation of whether there ex-
isted a "pattern" of misconduct had upon the case.
109. The committee reports and congressional record assessing the 1993 Crime Act never
substantively discuss § 14141.
110. See H.R. REP. No. 102-242 (1991).
111. Compare id. at 76-77 with 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a) (1994).
112. The Department of Justice has relied upon this exact argument. See Memorandum of
Law in Support of Joint Motion for Entry of Consent Decree at 3, United States v. City of
Steubenville, No. C2 97-966 (S.D. Ohio filed Aug. 28, 1997) ("There is no separate legislative
history for... 42 U.S.C. § 14141, but the legislative history of the predecessor bill is relevant
because the language of that bill was identical, in pertinent part....").
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The 1991 Judiciary Committee Report emphasized that § 14141's vir-
tually identical predecessor does not "impose any new standards of con-
duct on police officers," but rather enables a court to identify "a pattern
of abuse... [and] bring it to an end with a single legal action.' 13 While
the report never explicitly defined the term "pattern or practice," it pos-
ited that "pattern or practice authority is needed.., to address patterns
or practices such as the lack of training, or the routine use of deadly
chokeholds, or the absence of a monitoring and disciplinary system.'
1 4
Moreover, it provided examples of a "pattern or practice" in the form of
"[t]wo cases [that] illustrate both the need for the authority and how it
will work.""'
The first case cited by the Committee Report, Davis v. Mason
County, was a § 1983 case arising from four incidents involving excessive
use of force by police officers during routine traffic stops within a nine-
month period in Mason County, Washington."' In addition to finding
that the individual sheriffs violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the
trial court held Mason County liable as a result of its failure to ade-
quately train its officers in the constitutional use of force.' In affirming
the trial court's findings, the Ninth Circuit described Mason County's
training program as "woefully inadequate, if it can be said to have existed
at all," and in direct violation of Washington state law on police train-
ing."" Though the Davis court was powerless to award relief other than
damages, the Committee Report clarified that § 14141 would authorize
the court to force Mason County to correct its deficient training proce-
dures."9
In Swann v. Goldsboro, the second case described by the Committee
Report, police officers in Goldsboro, North Carolina strangled a young
black man to death."' Evidence at trial apparently demonstrated that the
defendant officers had been involved in numerous previous incidents in-
volving excessive force without incurring disciplinary action and that the
city of Goldsboro had an official policy against investigating incidents of
excessive force. Once again, though the Swann court lacked the authority
to provide remedies other than the $220,000 damage award, the report
113. H.R. REP. No. 102-242, at 402-03 (1991).
114. Id. at 403.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 404 (discussing Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1991)).
117. See Davis, 927 F.2d at 1479-82.
118. Id. at 1482.
119. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, at 404 (1991).




indicated that under § 14141 the court could have acted to "order reme-
dies for the glaring deficiencies the case highlighted.'
2'
The report's discussion of these two cases indicates that the Attorney
General could prove a "pattern or practice" under § 14141 without pro-
viding extensive evidence of systematically repeated instances of miscon-
duct. Apparently, evidence of a few individual fights violations, coupled
with evidence of an institutional police practice or policy condoning or
contributing to police misconduct-in Davis a practice of insufficient
training, in Swann a policy against investigating misconduct-is enough
to constitute a "pattern or practice."
But while the Committee report includes examples providing guid-
ance regarding the level of evidence necessary to constitute a "pattern or
practice" in cases involving an egregious police policy, a plain language
reading of "pattern or practice" suggests that the Attorney General can
satisfy § 14141 without offering any evidence as to an institutional prac-
tice or policy at al1.'' By providing evidence of enough related individual
instances of rights violations, the Attorney General surely could demon-
strate a "pattern... of conduct" that would violate § 14141. Indeed, in
recounting the impetus for the legislation, the Committee report de-
scribed testimony regarding egregious patterns of misconduct that arose
without identified contributory institutional policies: routine
"unconstitutional, harassing stops and searches of minority individuals"
in Boston and repeated arrests of "bystanders who complain about police
actions" in New York City.3
Unfortunately, the report sheds no light on the question of how nu-
merous, frequent, or similar such rights deprivations must be to consti-
tute a pattern under § 14141 without a contributory institutional policy or
supervisory practice. Bereft of guidance from either the statutory text or
the legislative history of § 14141, courts will likely look to interpretations
of similar language in other statutes for guidance on this question.
3. Judicial Construction of "Pattern or Practice"
As a legislative phrase, "pattern or practice" has been employed re-
peatedly in civil rights statutes authorizing the Attorney General to bring
suits to remedy discrimination.2 4 In each of these civil rights statutes,
121. Id.
122. This point can be looked at in one of two ways: (1) evidence of enough repeated,
similar instances of rights deprivations itself constitutes a "pattern of conduct," or (2) evidence
of enough repeated, similar instances of rights violations gives rise to an inference of an institu-
tional policy or practice of condoning such violations through inaction.
123. H.R. REP. No. 102-242, at 398 (1991).
124. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
6(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1994).
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Congress neglected to provide a statutory definition of the phrase. As a
result, courts have looked for guidance to the legislative history of the
earliest civil rights laws that employed the phrase. Moreover, courts have
assumed that Congress intended the phrase to bear the same meaning in
each of the statutes in which it appears.
In its seminal "pattern or practice" case, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, the Supreme Court held that "the 'pattern or
practice' language.., of Title VII was not intended as a term of art, and
the words reflect only their usual meaning. '""' Citing Title VII's legisla-
tive history,'2' the Teamsters Court held that to establish a "pattern or
practice" of employment discrimination, the Government must "prove
more than mere occurrence of isolated.., or sporadic discriminatory
acts. It had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that racial
discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure-the
regular rather than the unusual practice."' 27 Lower federal courts have
consistently adopted the same interpretation of "pattern or practice" lan-
guage when employed in other statutes outlawing discrimination.'25
While the doctrinal definition of "pattern or practice" identified by
the Teamsters court has been clear and consistent, its application to par-
ticular fact patterns has proven less so. Though the Teamsters Court
found that "pattern or practice" cases involved "controlling principles
that are relatively clear,, 129 lower courts have struggled to maintain a co-
herent and consistent approach to what set of facts constitutes a "pattern
or practice. '' "0
Courts have refused to adopt any exact formula for proving a
"pattern or practice" of discrimination. For example, in explaining
seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the number of incidents neces-
sary to constitute a pattern or practice,' the Seventh Circuit explicitly
125. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16
(1977).
126. In particular, the Court relied on Senator Humphrey's explanation of the term:
[A] pattern or practice would be present only where the denial of rights consists of
something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a
generalized nature.... [S]ingle, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single
business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice.
Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 14,270 (1964)).
127. Id. at 336.
128. See, e.g., United States v. DiMucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1497 n.11 (7th Cir. 1989)
(interpreting the Fair Housing Act); United States v. Mayton, 335 F.2d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1964)
(interpreting voting rights legislation).
129. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335.
130. See Paul E. Starkman, Alleging a "Pattern or Practice" Under ADEA: An Analysis of
the Impact and Problems of Proof, 8 LAB. L.J. 91, 92 (1992) ("[T]he legal principles to be ap-
plied in a pattern or practice case often have been difficult to discern and apply.").
131. Compare United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 929-30 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding six
incidents of discrimination at a housing complex in two months sufficient to constitute a pattern
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recognized the near impossibility of fashioning a consistent threshold of
discrimination that constitutes a pattern or practice. As a result, the court
emphasized that "each [pattern or practice] case must stand on its own
facts. '132 The Fifth Circuit has agreed: "The number of blacks actually
turned away or discriminated against is not determinative [of the exis-
tence of a pattern or practice] .... [N]o mathematical formula is work-
able, nor was any intended. Each case must turn on its own facts."133
In determining the existence of a "pattern or practice" of discrimina-
tion, courts have accepted and considered a wide array of evidence, in-
cluding anecdotal evidence of specific instances of discrimination, direct
evidence of general discriminatory policies, and statistical studies sug-
gesting discriminatory policies.134 United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club
provides a classic example: in successfully proving that an institution of
public accommodation engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination,
the Department of Justice offered both statistical evidence regarding the
racial composition of the club's membership and direct, anecdotal evi-
dence regarding specific instances of discrimination 35 Most likely, courts
will prove equally flexible regarding the forms of evidence with which the
Attorney General can demonstrate a "pattern or practice" of rights viola-
tions under § 14141.
In general, federal courts have interpreted the term "pattern or prac-
tice" of discrimination broadly.1 36 Under the Fourteenth Amendment and
many civil rights statutes, a plaintiff must prove disparate treatment in
order to prove discrimination, but in pattern or practice cases, the plain-
tiff may rely solely on disparate impact. '37 And the Supreme Court has
held that plaintiffs can make out a prima facie case of a "pattern or prac-
tice" of discrimination simply through the introduction of statistical evi-
dence.13 By accepting statistical evidence as sufficient proof of a "pattern
or practice" of discrimination, the Court made clear that plaintiffs need
not prove any overt institutional policy to satisfy the Teamsters definition
or practice of discrimination), with King v. General Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 617, 619, 627 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding seventeen instances of age discrimination at a company plant in three years in-
sufficient to constitute a pattern or practice of discrimination).
132. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d at 930.
133. United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971)
(citations omitted).
134. See EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1188 (4th Cir. 1981); Starkman,
supra note 130, at 115.
135. See United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 894 F.2d 83, 88-89 (3d Cir. 1990).
136. See Karen E. Rubin, Note, Judicial Remedies in "Pattern and Practice" Suits Under the
Fair Housing Act of 1968: United States v. City of Parma, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 109, 129 (1984-
85).
137. See Rubin, supra note 136, at 129; Starkman, supra note 130, at 102 (citing Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249,1267 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
138. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,308-09 (1977).
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of "pattern or practice." To the contrary, an institutional policy will be
inferred from disparate impact.
Applying the Teamsters definition of a "pattern or practice" to
§ 14141, the Attorney General must prove that rights deprivations are a
police department's "regular rather than unusual practice., 139 In meeting
that burden of proof, the Attorney General will be free to introduce a
wide variety of evidence, from statistical to anecdotal. Evidence of re-
peated, similar rights violations should enable the Attorney General to
make a prima facie case without proving any institutional policy.4 And
federal courts will likely adopt a case-specific, micro-analytical approach
to § 14141 cases, rendering it impossible to generate a formulaic answer
to what constitutes a "pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement
officers."
In sum, federal courts will likely rely upon the legislative history of
§ 14141 to find a "pattern or practice" whenever evidence establishes a
few related rights violations accompanied by an institutional police prac-
tice or policy. But examination of previous judicial constructions of the
term "pattern or practice" suggests that federal courts will not stop there.
In cases involving repeated, similar rights violations absent an institu-
tional practice or policy, courts will apply the Teamsters definition and
infer a "pattern or practice" from statistical evidence. In the process, fed-
eral judges will not only follow precedent, but will also further the reme-
dial goals of the statute-to bring police conduct into conformity with the
Constitution and laws of the United States
139. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,336 (1977).
140. In interpreting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court has held that, under its ordinary meaning,
a "pattern" is determined not by "the number of predicates" but by "the relationship that they
bear to each other or to some external organizing principle." H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 238 (1989). The two organizing principles generating a RICO pattern are
"that the racketeering [acts] are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued
activity." Id. at 239. Because this "continuity plus relationship" framework was derived from
RICO's legislative history, the framework has no automatic weight in interpreting what consti-
tutes a § 14141 "pattern or practice." But these concepts-relatedness and continuity-could
inform an application of § 14141 to repeated instances of rights deprivations by law enforce-
ment officers absent an institutional policy. Requiring that the instances of rights deprivations
be related-i.e., that they have "similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission," id. at 240-could inform the Teamsters requirement that incidents be more than
"isolated or sporadic" to constitute a "pattern or practice." Likewise, mandating continuity-
i.e., that the rights deprivations extend over a substantial period of time--could inform the
Teamsters requirement that the objectionable conduct be "standard operating procedure."
However, given the intense criticism that the RICO pattern framework has received, see, e.g.,
id. at 252-56 (Scalia, J., concurring), the Court may prove reluctant to extend the "continuity
plus relationship" framework beyond the RICO context. Still, the RICO case law suggests that
the Court will be willing to infer a "pattern or practice" from strong statistical evidence of re-
lated violations continuing over a substantial period of time.
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B. Section 14141(b): Enforcement
The enforcement portion of § 14141, codified as subsection (b), con-
tains three provisions that will affect the law's implementation. First, the
congressional decision to authorize only the U.S. Attorney General, and
not aggrieved individuals, to bring § 14141 actions will greatly reduce the
frequency of such suits and largely condition the law's success at curbing
police misconduct on effective and proactive implementation by the ex-
ecutive branch. Second, as a result of decades-old case law, the provision
that allows the Attorney General to file suit whenever she has
"reasonable cause" to believe a violation has occurred will effectively
render the decision of when and whether to bring a § 14141 action unre-
viewable. Finally, the simplicity and clarity of the language that author-
izes the Attorney General to "obtain appropriate equitable and declara-
tory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice" masks complex and
controversial questions of how to remedy systematic police misconduct.
The following section will examine each of these three provisions in de-
tail, with an emphasis on their likely impact on the nature of § 14141 liti-
gation and the influence of the various § 14141 actors-the Attorney
General, municipal defendants, the federal judiciary, and the communi-
ties and individuals affected by systematic police misconduct.
1. Governmental Standing: A Narrow Focus
Section 14141(a) consists of a sweeping declaratory statement that re-
peated unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement officers "shall be
unlawful." Yet the breadth of the law's declaratory portion is limited by
the narrow focus of its enforcement provision: only one person, the U.S.
Attorney General, is authorized to remedy a "pattern or practice" of
constitutional violations by police officers. Not authorized to initiate ac-
tions for relief, nor even to intervene in the Attorney General's suits, are
the victims of the constitutional deprivations resulting from the pattern
or practice.
As discussed above, original versions of § 14141 authorized victims of
the unlawful "pattern or practice" conduct, as well as the Attorney Gen-
eral, to pursue injunctive and declaratory relief..4 However, as a result of
threats of filibusters by Republican Senators and of a veto by President
Bush, private enforcement provisions were stripped from the precursor
141. See H.R. REP. No. 102-242, at 77 (1991) ("Any person injured by a violation of para-
graph (1) may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate
the pattern or practice.").
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bill to § 14141 during conference committee negotiations on the 1991
Crime Bill.' 42 The provisions would never resurface.
Congress's rejection of private enforcement represented a shift in
thinking about the objectives behind § 14141. Reacting to the Rodney
King videotape and the failure of traditional legal sanctions to curtail po-
lice abuses, the drafters of § 14141's precursor, the Police Accountability
Act, were searching for new legal regimes to force police departments to
adhere to constitutional principles. 143 To the drafters, apparently, the
overriding objective was to force police compliance; not surprisingly,
then, these legislators proposed extending the authority to initiate pat-
tern or practice suits to individuals as well as to the federal government,
thus increasing the reach and significance of the legislation. The result
was a bill that contained two checks upon local police: both the federal
government and aggrieved individuals were to be empowered to super-
vise the local exercise of police power.
The existence of two checks was no accident. The deterrent and re-
medial effects of granting the Attorney General standing depend entirely
on the Attorney General's commitment to enforcing the bill's prohibi-
tions.'" After twelve years of Republican control of the executive branch,
the drafters-liberal Democratic Members of Congress-were obviously
reluctant to entrust enforcement solely to the Department of Justice. As
a result, the original bill shifted power vertically from local governments
to individuals, as well as horizontally from local to federal governmental
entities. In reporting the bill, the House Committee on the Judiciary un-
derscored the importance of individual empowerment, describing indi-
vidual standing as "necessary, especially in situations where the Depart-
ment of Justice does not act."' 4
While police groups and conservative lawmakers predictably opposed
the bill in its entirety, they focused their ire principally upon the bill's in-
dividual standing provision. In the words of Bush Administration Assis-
tant Attorney General W. Lee Rawls, their principal, articulated concern
was that "[w]hile the Attorney General might be expected to exercise re-
straint... [a]ny individual who feels aggrieved by conduct that [she] per-
ceives to be part of a pattern or practice can file a suit that will be expen-
142. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
143. In addition to "pattern or practice" legislation, members of Congress suggested a host
of other bills with this end. See, e.g., Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 18, at 26 (statement of
Rep. Washington) (suggesting the addition of a specific reference to the protection of civil liber-
ties of citizens in the police officer oath); id. at 131 (statement of Rep. Edwards) (discussing the
amendment of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 to increase its effectiveness); id. at 133-34 (statement of
Rep. Washington) (proposing an increase in penalties for criminal civil rights violations by po-
lice and withholding of federal funds to states who do not pass similar penalty increases).
144. See infra notes 149, 172-174 and accompanying text.
145. H.R. REP. No. 102-242, at 402 (1991).
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sive and time-consuming to defend against., 146 But police groups and
conservative lawmakers surely must also have been concerned about
meritorious suits brought by individuals; individual standing to bring
"pattern or practice" suits presented a much greater danger of shifting
control over police practices from legislators, mayors, and police chiefs to
federal judges than granting the Attorney General such standing. With
public opinion firmly entrenched in the corner of law and order, the At-
torney General-who remains, even if indirectly, responsive to public
opinion-likely seemed far less dangerous than aggrieved individual vic-
tims. Riding the force of public opinion in favor of crime control, conser-
vative voices prevailed and eliminated the individual standing provi-
sions.147
As a result, in the process of winding its way through Congress,
§ 14141 developed into a measured shift in the law governing police mis-
conduct rather than the wholesale change proposed by the bill's drafters.
The elimination of the populist, counter-majoritarian check on the local
police power inherent in individual standing left only the intergovern-
mental, bureaucratic check represented by the Attorney General.
What will be the practical effects of the decision to delete individual
standing and to rely solely upon suits by the Attorney General? First and
foremost, the decision will greatly reduce the frequency of § 14141 ac-
tions. Since the law passed in 1994, the Attorney General has filed only
two § 14141 complaints against police departments.148 Were § 14141
available to private plaintiffs, many more "pattern or practice" com-
plaints would certainly have been filed.
146. Terence Moran & Daniel Klaidman, Justice's Study of Police Violence on Back
Burner, THE RECORDER, May 4, 1992, at 1 (quoting a letter from Assistant Attorney General
W. Lee Rawls to Rep. Henry Hyde).
147. Apparently, no thought was given to a compromise, giving individuals a qualified right
of action. One potential compromise-inspired by qui tam litigation-might have been to
authorize individual victims of § 14141 violations to bring suits for injunctive relief but require
that they first give notice to the Attorney General, who would have the authority to either (1)
intervene and litigate, (2) decline to intervene but allow the individual to go forward, or (3)
move to dismiss the case. See Anna Mae Walsh Burke, Qui Tam: Blowing the Whistle for Uncle
Sam, 21 NOVA L. REv. 869 (1997) (outlining of the history and current status of qui tam litiga-
tion). It should be noted that, like all qui tam litigation, this compromise example faces constitu-
tional questions regarding the standing of the non-governmental plaintiffs.
148. See infra notes 206-207 and accompanying text. This paucity of § 14141 cases may have
resulted in part from the difficulties of implementing new legislation, for example, a desire "to
make sure the first cases are sure, solid cases that help establish good law." Mark Curriden,
When Good Cops Go Bad, 82 A.B.A. J. 62, 63 (May 1996) (quoting Deval Patrick, Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division). The Department of Justice has recently threatened to
bring a third action against the city of Columbus, Ohio and its Division of Police. See Editorial,
Police Chief Needs to Accept Necessary Scrutiny, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 2, 1998, at C2.
Attorneys for the city of Columbus are apparently negotiating with the Justice Department re-
garding a possible consent decree. See Connie A. Higgins, Rice to Jackson: Provide Details of
Meeting, COLUmUs DISPATCH, Oct. 9, 1998, at C3.
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Moreover, the frequency of § 14141 actions will likely depend upon
the political ideology and commitment of the President of the United
States and, to a lesser extent, of Congress. As a number of legal analysts
have pointed out, the failure of the Reagan Administration to proactively
enforce the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA)-a
law authorizing the Attorney General to pursue injunctive relief to rem-
edy patterns or practices of constitutional deprivations against institu-
tionalized persons--demonstrates that providing the executive branch
with statutory authority to enjoin abuses does not necessarily translate
into enforcement. 149 Not only can an Administration choose not to en-
force § 14141, but Congress could deny the Department of Justice suffi-
cient funding to support its implementation. Because of the absence of
individual standing, governmental decisions by either political branch
could undermine the efficacy of the legislation."'
Second, the decision to limit standing to the Attorney General will al-
ter the nature of § 14141 litigation. Due to the investigative resources of
the federal government, each § 14141 case that is brought is likely to be
buttressed by substantial evidence, forcing the defendant municipality to
take the case seriously. As a result, defendants may prove interested in
settling through a consent decree rather than incurring the litigation and
publicity costs of defending a § 14141 action." Early returns suggest that
this will lead to a high settlement rate for individual cases: to date, both
of the § 14141 suits against police departments have culminated in com-
prehensive consent decrees altering police practices."l 3
The virtues of a high settlement rate are likely to be mixed. On the
one hand, not having to prove a "pattern or practice" in court will free up
Department of Justice resources to pursue additional § 14141 cases. On
149. See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 1524 n.279 ("The failure of the Civil Rights Division to
enforce the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, during the Rea-
gan/Bush years underscores the fact that giving the Justice Department such authority will not
ensure meaningful federal enforcement.").
150. Separation of powers principles prevent Congress from directing the Attorney General
not to enforce the statute. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983) ("Congress must
abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.").
However, Congress can use its spending power to control the level of funds available to the Jus-
tice Department in general and to the Civil Rights Division in particular. See Steven A. Holmes,
Federal Anti-Bias Spending Is Inadequate, Groups Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998 (detailing
Congress's rejection of Clinton Administration requests for large increases in funding for anti-
discrimination efforts including the Civil Rights Division). By controlling the level of funds
available to the Civil Rights Division, Congress can exercise indirect control over § 14141 en-
forcement.
151. It does not appear that aggrieved victims of patterns or practices of police brutality
will have any legal means to compel suits by the Attorney General. See infra notes 180-182 and
accompanying text.
152. For discussion of the litigation and publicity costs, see infra notes 210-211 and accom-
panying text.
153. See infra notes 206-207 and accompanying text.
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the other hand, repeated consent decrees will subvert judicial opportuni-
ties to interpret § 14141 and preempt the potential benefits of publicizing
governmental action against unconstitutional police patterns and prac-
tices.' 4
Moreover, though federal courts clearly have the authority to accept
or reject a proposed consent decree before entering it as a judicial order,
courts have generally exercised only limited review of consent decrees,'5s
granting particular deference to decrees approved by the Attorney Gen-
156eral . As a result of this limited and deferential posture towards consent
decree review, s7 a high settlement rate of § 14141 claims will largely shift
the role of structuring remedial change from federal judges to the Attor-
ney General and the lawyers for the defendant police departments and
municipalities.s Whether private parties or federal judges are better able
to design remedial injunctive relief is the subject of some dispute.159
Finally, as a result of the deletion of individual standing, communities
victimized by patterns or practices of police misconduct prohibited by
§ 14141 will have to rely on the federal government to pursue effective
injunctive remedies. The result is a classic agency problem due to the po-
154. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619
(1995); Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1084 (1984).
155. See Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986)
(requiring reviewing courts merely to ensure that consent decrees are within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court, within the scope of the pleadings, and in furtherance of the goals of the
statute on which the action was based); United States v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 692
F.2d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1333 (5th
Cir. 1980)) (requiring reviewing courts merely to determine that the proposed consent decree is
not "unconstitutional, unlawful.... contrary to public policy, or unreasonable"); see also Ran-
dolph D. Moss, Note, Participation and Department of Justice School Desegregation Consent
Decrees, 95 YALE L.J. 1811, 1820-21 (1986).
156. See United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981); Kelley v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 717 F. Supp. 507, 515-16 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law
by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Re-
form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 918 (discussing courts' willingness to grant "what amounts to auto-
matic approval" to government-negotiated consent decrees).
157. In contrast to their general authority to review consent decrees, federal courts have
enjoyed greatly increased authority in antitrust cases and class actions. In class actions, Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(e) has been interpreted to require federal courts to hold fairness
hearings at which the proponents of a settlement must prove it to be fair, reasonable, and ade-
quate. See Moss, supra note 155, at 1831. Under the Tunney Act, federal judges must subject
antitrust consent decrees to a far-ranging inquiry to determine "that the entry of such [a consent
decree] is in the public interest." 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1994).
158. It should be noted that the trial courts retain some discretion over the nature of con-
sent decree review. See Schwarzschild, supra note 156, at 911, 913 (pointing out that a few
courts have held fairness hearings, though rarely in cases involving the government as plaintiff).
In considering one of the two § 14141 consent decrees entered to date, U.S. District Judge Rob-
ert Cindrich held a public hearing on the proposed consent decree. See Michael A. Fuoco, Po-
lice Accord Hearing Set, PITrSBURGH POsT-GAzETTE, Mar. 8, 1997, at C2.
159. Compare Fiss, supra note 154, at 1083-84, with Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Mai-
man, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. & Soc'Y
REv. 11 (1984).
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 17:149, 1998
tentially different goals of the Department of Justice and of victimized
communities. 6 ' This agency problem could surface in two different forms.
First, because victimized communities and individuals cannot compel
a § 14141 suit, 161 they must rely upon the Justice Department to actively
enforce § 14141 through adequate funding and prioritization. And even
if the Department does engage in active § 14141 enforcement, individual
communities will have to abide by the Department's system of case selec-
tion and resource commitment.
Second, past experience in related institutional reform suits suggests
that advocacy groups, affected communities, and individual victims will
have little opportunity to influence the negotiation, design, or implemen-
tation of a § 14141 consent decree. Because consent decrees in institu-
tional reform cases are often filed on the same day as the initial com-
plaints,4 affected individuals and groups will need to be vigilant indeed
or consent decrees will be entered before they are aware of the case.
Even if aware of the suit, affected individuals and groups will likely be
legally incapable of intervening in § 14141 cases. 16 In similar civil rights
cases initiated by the government, courts have generally assumed ade-
quate representation of all citizens' interests and consequently not per-
mitted intervention as of right by victims or advocacy groups." 6 Courts
160. The views of the Justice Department regarding what policies and procedures will
eradicate the "pattern or practice" of rights violations will not always match the views of vic-
tims, who may have more radical views of the needed changes. As a repeat player in § 14141
cases, the Justice Department may have an interest in developing a consent decree blueprint,
see infra note 204 and accompanying text, rather than focusing solely on the particular pattern
or practice as victims would. For a discussion of agency problems in civil rights suits brought by
the Justice Department, see Schwarzschild, supra note 156, at 918 (Title VII suits), and Moss,
supra note 155, at 1825-29 (school desegregation suits).
161. See infra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
162. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
163. The Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department clearly does not have adequate
funding to perform comprehensive oversight of each of the nation's police forces. See infra
notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
164. See Schwarzschild, supra note 156, at 913. In both § 14141 cases to date, the Justice De-
partment filed the consent decree and the underlying complaint simultaneously. Telephone In-
terview with Robert Moossy, Staff Attorney, Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Spe-
cial Litigation Section (Jan. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Moossy Interview].
165. Both intervention as of right and permissive intervention are governed by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 24. In order to qualify for intervention as of right, the moving party
must (1) file a timely motion, (2) assert an interest relating to the subject of the action, (3) dem-
onstrate that the action's disposition may impair the protection of that interest, and (4) show
that the interest will not be adequately represented by existing parties. See United States v.
Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Michigan, 680 F. Supp. 928, 950-51
(W.D. Mich. 1987); JAMES W. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrCE 24.07[1] (1993). In or-
der to qualify for permissive intervention, the moving party must (1) file a timely motion, (2)
make a claim or defense involving a common question of law or fact with the main action, and
(3) show an independent grounds for jurisdiction to support the intervention. See Cook v. Pan
Amer. World Airways, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 693, 698-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
166. See Moss, supra note 155, at 1821 n.52 (listing school desegregation cases brought by
the government in which intervention was denied); Schwarzschild, supra note 156, at 914-23 &
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also have an additional reason to reject intervention as of right in § 14141
cases: because prospective intervenors lack independent standing to pur-
sue injunctive relief, the government's § 14141 action will not jeopard-
ize intervenors' ability to protect any legal interest.' Moreover, because
affected individuals and groups in § 14141 cases cannot establish inde-
pendent grounds for jurisdiction to pursue injunctive relief, they will
likely also fail the test for permissive intervention. 69 Finally, while non-
litigating parties on whose behalf a court order is entered may petition
the court to enforce the order,70 parties who would lack standing to bring
the original action may not.
1 7 1
Affected individuals, communities, and advocacy groups have had
more success entering institutional reform suits as amici curiae,1'7 but as
such they are precluded from initiating legal proceedings, filing plead-
ings, pursuing enforcement or modification of any equitable judgment or
consent decree, or exercising any judicially cognizable power to endorse
or veto any consent decree.73 As a result, absent judicial solicitude for
their opinions and interests, such individuals or groups must depend
largely upon the Justice Department to pursue effective structural
changes to remedy the particular pattern of abuse. 74
In order to ensure that the views and interests of victims and affected
communities are reflected in § 14141 consent decrees, federal judges
would be wise to employ a less limited and deferential policy in reviewing
consent decrees. Not only should judges carefully consider the submis-
sions of amici curiae, but they should ponder conducting public hearings
in order to ensure that victims and communities are aware and generally
nn.166-67 (listing Title VII cases brought by government in which intervention was denied);
John Kip Cornwell, Note, CRIPA: The Failure of Federal Intervention for Mentally Retarded
People, 97 YALE L.J. 845, 854-56 (1988) (listing CRIPA cases in which intervention was de-
nied). But see United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988) (overturning the lower
court's denial of an affected inmates' motion to intervene in a CRIPA case).
167. See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
168. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
169. See Mopaz Diamonds, Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 822 F. Supp. 1053,
1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); MOORE, supra note 165, 24.18[4]. Affected individuals and groups
cannot establish independent grounds for jurisdiction because they lack independent standing.
170. See FED. R. CIV. P. 71; Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1566-67 (2d Cir. 1985).
171. See MOORE, supra note 165, 71.03 ("Rule 71 does nothing to disturb the require-
ment of a standing to sue."); Moore v. Tangipahoa, 625 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1980).
172. See Schwarzschild, supra note 156, at 923-26.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143,163-67 (6th Cir. 1991).
174. See Schwarzschild, supra note 156, at 889. This dependence upon DOJ may be exacer-
bated by a high settlement rate, which reduces the role of the federal judge-a neutral third-
party who may be more attuned to the community's interests-in designing injunctive relief. See
supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text; cf Moss, supra note 155, at 1818-19, 1821 (arguing
that participation of affected parties is particularly important in school desegregation consent
decrees because of the limited role of the federal judge).
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supportive of § 14141 consent decrees.' Such hearings could go a long
way towards assuring victims a stake in the § 14141 process and repairing
relationships between communities and police departments. If courts
should fail to seek out proactively the views and interests of victims and
affected communities, Congress should amend § 14141 to require courts
to do so-possibly through the requirement of fairness hearings analo-
gous to those applicable to class actions. 7'
2. Reasonable Cause
Section 14141 only authorizes the Attorney General to pursue injunc-
tive relief when she "has reasonable cause to believe that a violation...
has occurred." This clause suggests that § 14141 might require some pre-
liminary showing of reasonable cause by the Attorney General. How-
ever, in addressing similar statutory language in other civil rights laws,
federal courts have repeatedly held the Attorney General's determina-
tion of "reasonable cause" to be beyond judicial review.177 Courts have
generally assumed that "[a] sufficient complaint, by its substantial allega-
tions with respect to the existence of a 'pattern or practice'... , will
clearly demonstrate the basis of the Attorney General's 'reasonable
cause to believe."'1 78 In enacting the similarly drafted CRIPA, Congress
clearly expressed its intent that "the decision of the Attorney General to
file suit be... unreviewable.,, 179 Though the legislative history of § 14141
is not as explicit as that of CRIPA, it is a safe assumption that federal
courts will continue to interpret the "reasonable cause" determination as
an unreviewable guideline rather than a threshold requirement.
175. See supra note 158.
176. See FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 23; supra note 157.
177. See United States v. Northside Realty Assoc., Inc., 518 F.2d 884, 889-90 (5th Cir. 1975)
(declining to review the Attorney General's "reasonable cause" determination under the Fair
Housing Act); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973)
(declining to review the Attorney General's "reasonable cause" determination under Fair
Housing Act); United States v. International Assoc. of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers Local No. 1, 438 F.2d 679, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1971) (declining to review the Attorney
General's "reasonable cause" determination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6); United States v.
Greenwood Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 406 F.2d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1969) (declining to review
the Attorney General's "reasonable cause" determination under 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6); United
States v. City of Philadelphia, 838 F. Supp. 223, 227 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("It is well settled that the
reasonableness of the Attorney General's belief [of cause to bring Fair Housing action] is not
subject to judicial review."), affd, 30 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir. 1994); cf. United States v. Pennsylvania,
863 F. Supp. 217, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding "that the Attorney General is vested with the
discretion to bring suit [under CRIPA] whenever she is satisfied that a case is serious enough to
warrant federal involvement"). But see United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., Inc., 484 F.2d 438,
444-45 (5th Cir. 1973) (subjecting the Attorney General's "reasonable cause" determination
under Fair Housing Act to very deferential judicial review).
178. Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 438 F.2d at 681; see also United States
v. Gustin-Bacon Div. Certain-Teed Prod. Corp., 426 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1970).
179. S. REP. No. 96-416, at 29 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 787,811.
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The unreviewability of the Attorney General's reasonable cause de-
termination will extend even more powerfully to any decision not to file a
§ 14141 action. The deletion of individual standing during the legislative
history of § 14141 will clearly undercut any argument that the statute im-
plied a private right of action to compel enforcement.'o Moreover, in
Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court recognized that "an agency's deci-
sion not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal proc-
ess, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discre-
tion.''. In deciding whether to file a § 14141 action, the Department of
Justice must not only decide whether a violation has occurred but also
whether the particular case is winnable, worthy of resource commitment,
and amenable to effective injunctive relief. According to Chaney, such
policy decisions are better made by the Attorney General than the fed-
eral courts.1' As a result, private parties will lack authority to compel
§ 14141 enforcement.
The unreviewability of the reasonable cause determination will also
have important procedural effects. In order to survive a motion to dis-
miss, the Attorney General need not plead facts supporting the reason-
able cause determination, but rather need only plead allegations that,
viewed in the light most favorable to the Attorney General, could sup-
port a "pattern or practice" claim.' Thus, in bringing § 14141 actions, the
Attorney General will have virtually automatic access to court-governed
discovery through the filing of a complaint detailing repeated incidents of
police abuse.'4
3. Designing Equitable Relief
After successfully proving a violation of § 14141(a), § 14141(b)
authorizes the Attorney General to "obtain appropriate equitable and
declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice." This statutory
language clearly and concisely grants federal courts the power to force
police departments and municipalities to take necessary steps to ensure
180. Plaintiffs alleging an implied right of action must "demonstrate that Congress intended
to make a private right of action available." Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (citing
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). The original inclusion and subsequent deletion of individual
standing in § 14141 will make such an allegation untenable.
181. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (citations omitted).
182. See id. at 831-32.
183. Given the liberal pleading standards of Federal R Civil Procedure 8(a), such allega-
tions will not require much factual accompaniment. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcot-
ics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,168 (1993).
184. The virtually automatic access to court-governed discovery and thus subpoena power
may at least partially offset the following objection. Critics have argued that the lack of grand
jury power to "force information from witnesses," particularly recalcitrant police officer wit-
nesses, will undermine the efficacy of § 14141. Curriden, supra note 148, at 64.
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future compliance with § 14141. But how federal courts or, in the case of
a consent decree, the parties themselves should exercise this power is far
less clear.
While police policy analysts generally agree that the problems of ex-
cessive force and other misconduct are ubiquitous in contemporary
American policing, there is little consensus concerning how to remedy
these problems. Police analysts disagree vehemently over the virtues of
such potential remedial steps as civilian review boards"' and early warn-
ing systems to detect patterns of complaints against particular officers."s6
No doubt these disagreements stem in part from the lack of empirical
data concerning police abuses and remedial policies.'8 But whatever the
cause, this lack of consensus leaves the Attorney General and federal
courts in a difficult position in designing "appropriate equitable and de-
claratory relief."
As supporters of proactive implementation of "pattern or practice"
legislation have pointed out, fashioning remedial relief will not always be
complicated.' For example, in cases involving a pattern or practice of
mistreatment resulting directly from an unconstitutional police policy, a
federal court may only need to enjoin implementation of the policy to
eliminate the pattern or practice."9 In cases where courts are able to at-
tribute patterns or practices of misconduct to a particular cause, such as a
lack of training,19° courts should not find it difficult to take steps to rem-
edy the particular cause. Finally, in "pattern or practice" cases involving
more complicated causes, supporters of proactive implementation argue
that even a modest order requiring a police department to follow its own
policies and report allegations of misconduct to the court would be of
great utility in curbing police abuse.' However, the history of injunctive
185. Compare Andrew Bayley, Preface to COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE: THE TREND
TO EXTERNAL REvIEW at ix (Andrew J. Goldsmith ed., 1991) ("[Plolice cannot be trusted to
police themselves.... [C]ivilian review is critical to the legitimacy of the police."), with
SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 28, at 227 (citing arguments that civilian review is ineffective and
antagonistic to police).
186. Compare SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 28, at 232 (arguing that early detection sys-
tems can be effective in identifying problem officers), with PEREZ, supra note 5, at 29-30
(arguing that very few officers receive large numbers of complaints).
187. See SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 28, at 227. As mentioned above, the 1994 Crime
Bill included a provision that requires the Attorney General to gather data on the use of exces-
sive force by police officers. See supra note 98.
188. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 24, at 1526-27.
189. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 99-100 (1983) (describing the dis-
trict court's preliminary injunction against the use of a potentially lethal chokehold except when
the officer threatened with death or serious bodily injury).
190. See, e.g., Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1482-83 (9th Cir. 1991) (identifying
unconstitutional police actions as resulting from the absence of training).
191. See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 1527 (arguing that even modest orders can be effective
by publicizing both patterns of abuse and ineffective municipal responses); see also Thomas v.
County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1993) (granting a preliminary injunction
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relief in civil rights cases suggests that remedial injunctions are more dif-
ficult to design, expensive to administer, and challenging to control than
supporters of proactive implementation recognize. 19' Courts are more ex-
perienced and adept at the art of identifying rights than fashioning insti-
tutional injunctions.1 93 The negotiation of consent decrees removes the
burden of designing remedial relief to the litigating parties, avoiding the
pitfalls of judicial action. However, the settlement of structural litigation
provokes its own concerns in the potential for coercion, displacement of
costs onto uninvolved third parties, and a lack of judicial information to
judge the equity of the settlement.194
As is obvious from the historic inability of municipalities to success-
fully balance effective crime control with constitutional police practices,
designing an organizational structure that will police the police promises
to be a complicated task. As one commentator on structural injunctions
has pointed out, courts must struggle with the "sheer difficulty of devising
an intellectually coherent solution to certain social problems. Causes may
be poorly understood; a technology for effectively dealing with them may
not exist; progress may be inherently difficult to measure."' 9 The intrac-
tability of a problem like police misconduct makes it a continual candi-
date for constitutional suits, but a difficult subject for comprehensive in-
junctive relief. Whether § 14141 proves a potent weapon against police
misconduct may rest in large part on the capability of federal judges and
the Department of Justice at designing effective equitable relief.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 14141
Due to the Attorney General's exclusive authority to bring suit under
§ 14141, the statute's success at curbing police misconduct will be deter-
mined largely by the effectiveness of its implementation by the Depart-
ment of Justice. As with any governmental program, this will depend
upon the resources available, the efficiency of resource allocation, and
the accuracy of the policy prescription. Because, as discussed below,
funding will not prove sufficient to enable comprehensive oversight of
the nation's police forces, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice De-
partment will need to capitalize on and exploit all of its available re-
sources to implement § 14141. The following section will discuss the level
with these terms in a § 1983 case).
192. According to Professor Schuck, "[c]ommentators willing to hazard a judgment usually
conclude that in general, structural orders have been largely, though not wholly, ineffective."
SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 154.
193. See John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1121, 1123 (1996).
194. See SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 160-61.
195. Id. at 155.
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of resources available to the Justice Department and make recommenda-
tions regarding methods of conserving resources. It will examine the De-
partment's current legal strategies, particularly its emphasis on negotiat-
ing consent decrees. The section will discuss, in general fashion, the first
two consent decrees under § 14141 in order to determine the Depart-
ment's current prescriptive strategies. And finally, the section will exam-
ine the degree to which community and interest groups can indirectly use
§ 14141 to pursue police reform, despite their lack of direct standing to
bring a § 14141 action.
A. Resource Allocation: Staffing and Funding Levels
In recent years, the responsibilities of the Justice Department's Civil
Rights Division have increased dramatically. Since 1993, Congress has
expanded the Division's duties to include the prosecution of church arson
crimes, the enforcement of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act (FACE) and § 14141.196 During that time, however, Congress has not
increased the Division's budget commensurately. According to Isabelle
Katz Pinzler, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, during
this period "the Division's funding has remained essentially flat."' 9 The
Clinton Administration has requested and received a modest increase in
the Division's funding for Fiscal Year 1998.198 However, the Administra-
tion's request for a sizable increase in the Division's budget for FY 1999
has apparently encountered opposition in Congress.!" If the Division is to
proactively enforce § 14141, it will need continued increased funding for
implementation.
The Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division has borne
the lion's share of the Division's increased responsibilities. Since 1993,
the Section has assumed civil enforcement responsibility for § 14141 and
FACE to augment its existing responsibility for the CRIPAYo The Sec-
196. Oversight of the Civil Rights Division: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1997), 1997 WL 10571840, at *1
(statement of Isabelle Katz Pinzler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division)
[hereinafter Oversight Hearings].
197. Id. In FY 1994, the Civil Rights Division spent $59.85 million; in FY 1997, the Divi-
sion's estimated budget was $62 million-an increase of only 3.6%. Compare BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FY 1996, at 627 App. (1995), with BUDGET OF THE UNrrED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FY 1998, at 662 App. (1997).
198. In FY 1998, the Civil Rights Division will receive an estimated $68 million, $6 million
more than in FY 1997. See id, see also Oversight Hearings, supra note 196, at *1 (statement of
Isabelle Katz Pinzler).
199. See Steven A. Holmes, Federal Anti-Bias Spending Is Inadequate, Groups Say, N.Y.
TMES, Oct. 8, 1998 (detailing Congressional rejection of sizable increases in budgets of the
EEOC, HUD's fair housing program, the Civil Rights Division of DOJ, and other agencies that
investigate complaints of bias).
200. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 196, at *8 (statement of Isabelle Katz Pinzler). It
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tion consists of one Section Chief, two Deputy Chiefs, and 22 full-time
and two part-time attorneys.2' According to a Special Litigation Section
staff attorney, there are no investigators assigned full-time to the Sec-
tion."'
The absence of full-time investigators means that the Justice Depart-
ment will depend heavily on external sources of information regarding
§ 14141 violations. Not surprisingly, in Pittsburgh-the only large city yet
targeted for a § 14141 case-the Department apparently relied heavily on
investigations and information developed by the ACLU.Y
Implementing legislation designed to enforce constitutional principles
in our nation's police forces, prisons, and abortion clinics is a Herculean
task. Clearly, twenty-seven attorneys, who bear the additional responsi-
bility of investigating and reforming prison conditions and monitoring
and assuring clinic access, cannot perform comprehensive oversight of
our nation's police forces. The Department of Justice simply does not
have the resources to bring suit against every police force that engages in
a pattern or practice of rights violations. As a result, there is a danger
that § 14141 will devolve into a last-resort tool to remedy egregious po-
lice policies and reform the worst police departments, rather than a pro-
active tool to improve American policing nationwide.
In order to avoid this devolution, the Department of Justice should
take two steps: first, use the § 14141 cases it does bring to fashion a blue-
print for a model police institutional structure. If the Department's blue-
print is widely understood and recognized as effective in curtailing mis-
conduct, municipalities can learn what steps to take both to improve their
police departments and to avoid § 14141 litigation. Second, the De-
partment should design a comprehensive strategy to control police be-
havior that strategically employs all of its resources including both crimi-
nal prosecutions of individual officers and § 14141 enforcement suits.
Criminal prosecutions of police officers can double as investigative tech-
niques to determine the existence of patterns or practices of misconduct.
Moreover, prosecutions can alert municipalities of the need to revise de-
should be noted that U.S. Attorney's Offices can engage in investigation and enforcement of
§ 14141; indeed, the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of New York appears to be
leading the investigation of the New York City Police Department triggered by the Louima in-
cident. See supra note 6.
201. See Moossy Interview, supra note 164.
202. See id. According to Moossy, federal agents do from time to time assist the Special
Litigation attorneys with investigative tasks. See id.
203. See Jeff Gammage, Pittsburgh Consents to Federal Reforms of Police Department,
PrITSBURGH POST-GAZErrE, Mar. 5,1997, at A3.
204. It should be noted that a Justice Department blueprint for police reform might become
a ceiling above which no municipality would venture. This ceiling could slow potential reforms
or discourage experimentation, particularly if the Department does not continually update the
blueprint with the latest strategies.
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partment policies and procedures to conform with a Justice Department
blueprint. As one commentator has pointed out, "the possibility of
[§ 14141] action will make all the other tools the Justice Department has
at its disposal more effective." 205
B. Legal Strategy: The Pursuit of Consent Decrees
Since 1994, the Attorney General has launched a number of § 14141
investigations of police departments ° and has taken legal action against
two police departments, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Steubenville,
207Ohio. In both cases, the Department of Justice and the defendants ne-
gotiated settlements prior to the official commencement of litigation. As
a result, in each case the Department filed its complaint and the negoti-
ated consent decree simultaneously, resolving the cases in a manner that
ensures a federal district court's involvement in oversight of the decree's
implementation."
While a handful of investigations and two police department cases
constitute very little empirical evidence from which to draw inferences,
the Justice Department appears to have adopted an initial § 14141 strat-
egy of investigation and negotiation, opting to pursue consent decrees
rather than litigated judgments. Such a conciliatory strategy comes as no
surprise. In implementing CRIPA-similarly crafted legislation which
authorizes the Attorney General to bring pattern or practice cases to pro-
tect the rights of institutionalized persons-the Department has chosen
205. Hoffman, supra note 24, at 1526.
206. The Department is currently officially investigating police departments in Columbus,
New Orleans, Los Angeles, New York City, Buffalo, and Orange County, as well as juvenile
detention facilities in Louisiana. Moossy Interview, supra note 164; see also Mark Curriden, Po-
lice Rank 7 in Abuse Reports, CHATTANOOGA TIMEs, Apr. 1, 1996, at Al (quoting Assistant
Attorney General Deval Patrick as confirming investigations in L.A., New Orleans, and Phila-
delphia, as well as "a number of major investigations [of] police and sheriffs departments").
The Department has reportedly determined that the Police Division of Columbus, Ohio, has
violated § 14141 and is currently negotiating a consent decree with the city. See Connie A. Hig-
gins, Rice to Jackson: Provide Details of Meeting, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 9, 1998, at C3.
207. See Complaint, United States v. City of Steubenville, No. C2 97-966 (S.D. Ohio filed
Aug. 28, 1997); Complaint, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. filed Feb.
26, 1997). The Department is reportedly in the process of negotiating a third consent decree
with the city of Columbus, Ohio, and its Division of Police. See supra note 206. Complaints were
also filed and consent decrees reached with a sheriffs office in Iberia Parish, Louisiana, and the
juvenile detention system of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, but both actions focused on de-
tention policies and conditions rather than police practices. Moossy Interview, supra note 164.
208. Consent Decree J 96, City of Steubenville, No. C2 97-966 ("The Court shall retain ju-
risdiction of this action for all purposes during the term of this Decree."); Consent Decree 79,
City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (same). The same Department appears to be applying the same
strategy in its investigation of Columbus, Ohio, where the Department has reportedly deter-
mined that the city's Division of Police has violated § 14141 but has delayed filing suit pending
negotiations over a potential consent decree. See Higgins, supra note 206.
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to pursue litigation only if a negotiated consent decree could not be
achieved.2 9
In pursuing a strategy of negotiating consent decrees, the Department
of Justice operates from a position of strength. No municipality could
relish the prospect of a § 14141 trial. The publicity surrounding a trial pit-
ting the municipality against the federal government over incidents of
police misconduct would be enormous and largely injurious.20 The mone-
tary costs of litigating a protracted § 14141 trial would be exorbitant.211 A
judgment that the municipality violated § 14141 would not only subject
the local police department to a structural injunction designed by a fed-
eral judge, but also could provide existing police misconduct suits with
additional evidence and spark new individuals to sue for damages. As a
result, municipalities will likely respond favorably to Justice Department
overtures regarding the possibilities of settlement.
The strategy of pursuing settlement rather than litigation will have
profound consequences on the effectiveness of § 14141. On the positive
side, pursuing settlement and avoiding litigation will allow the Special
Litigation Section to conserve resources-an important goal considering
the Section's limited manpower. Proving a pattern or practice case in
court would require extensive discovery and trial preparation, as well as
courtroom advocacy. Negotiating settlements frees-up Department re-
sources to take on new investigations and expand oversight of the na-
tion's police forces.
Successful settlement negotiations could also encourage the defen-
dant municipality to support rather than oppose the structural changes.
Since the municipal and police officials will be managing the system on a
day-to-day basis, acrimonious litigation can jeopardize the viability of
structural relief before it has even been entered. 12 Conversely, if munici-
209. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 196, at *8 (statement of Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Isabelle Katz Pinzler) ("[W]here cooperative efforts fail [in CRIPA cases], we have been
obliged to file suit .... ") (emphasis added); cf Cornwell, supra note 166, at 849. Unlike § 14141,
the text of CRIPA itself provides evidence of Congressional preference for settlement, requir-
ing that the Attorney General notify the offending state of the alleged CRIPA violation "at
least forty-nine days before suit is filed to allow adequate time for consultation and possible
resolution of problems without the need for further legal action." Cornwall, supra note 166, at
847 (footnotes omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997b (1994).
210. How injurious the publicity would be, of course, depends upon the local community's
views of the Department of Justice and the federal government.
211. During discovery alone in City of Philadelphia, the Department of Justice provided
over 800 pages of interrogatory answers, including detailed allegations of 810 prisoners injured
and 290 shootings by Philadelphia police officers. See Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 18,
at 174 (statement of Drew Days, Professor, Yale Law School); Stephanie L. Franklin, Com-
ment, United States v. City of Philadelphia: A Continued Quest for an Effective Remedy for Po-
lice Misconduct, 7 BLACK L.J. 180, 183 n.16 (1981). The costs of preparing for trial and actually
litigating a case of this scope would be immense.
212. See SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 170 (noting the opportunities for defendants to under-
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pal and police officials agree with the changes being implemented, the
prospects for a decree's success improve dramatically. The probability of
support for the decree among local officials is greatly enhanced by the
negotiation of settlements. 3 Indeed, one academic analyst of structural
decrees has posited that, in institutional reform cases, negotiated settle-
ment provides the only possible route to success: "Litigated structural
remedies break down; only negotiated structural remedies work.,
214
On the other hand, consent decrees in institutional reform litigation
could undermine a court's understanding of the underlying problem2 5
and thus merely delay costs and acrimony. In many institutional reform
cases, trial judges have no opportunity to supervise discovery or to over-
see trial proceedings because the consent decree is filed the same day as
the underlying complaint. 6 Because of the limited, deferential standard
of review of consent decrees, few courts will analyze a decree in great de-
tail before entry.27 As a result, if one party returns to the court to ask for
modification of the decree, "the judge is at a loss: He has no basis for as-
sessing the request., 218 While the judge can, of course, hold lengthy
hearings to reconstruct the underlying problem, such an inquiry could
eliminate the resources conserved by the original settlement. 9 Moreover,
if the plaintiff returns to the court with a request for judicial enforcement
of the decree's terms, judges are generally reluctant to impose contempt
sanctions for violations of a "mere bargain between the parties.'' O
Analyses of the implementation of CRIPA have focused some criti-
cism of the Justice Department's emphasis on negotiating settlements. In
particular, CRIPA critics have argued that the Department's negotiation
strategy proved ineffective because consent decrees were long delayed,
poorly drafted, weakly administered, and failed to adequately address the
mine structural injunctions through outright refusal to obey or "foot-dragging and minimal-
ism"); Schwarzschild, supra note 156, at 899; Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in In-
stitutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1020, 1026-27 (1986).
213. For example, in Pittsburgh, both Mayor Murphy and Police Chief Robert W. McNeilly
expressed their support for the consent decree. See Marylynne Pitz & John M.R. Bull, Court
OKs City Police Reform Agreement: Settles U.S. Suit Charging Patterns of Abuse, PrrrSBURGH
POST-GAZETrE, Apr. 17, 1997, at Cl; Michael A. Fuoco, Police Recoil, Union Chief Says No
'Extra Steps'If Court Approves City-Justice Pact, PrrrsBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 5, 1997, at
Al. It should be noted, however, that the police union vigorously opposed the consent decree,
even threatening that officers will no longer "take that extra step" to stop crime. Fuoco, supra,
at Al.
214. Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in Trilateral Disputes, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1011,
1012 (1993).
215. See Schwartzschild, supra note 156, at 913.
216. See supra notes 164 & 208.
217. See supra notes 155-157 and accompanying text.
218. Fiss, supra note 154, at 1083.




needs of the institutionalized.2' Because private interest groups have
generally been unable to intervene in CRIPA actions, these groups could
not remedy perceived deficiencies in the Department's strategy." Sec-
tion 14141 could pose similar problems, as victims and advocacy groups
will face similar difficulties in influencing § 14141 actions.
To date, these criticisms do not seem to attach to § 14141 enforce-
ment., As discussed above, there is every reason to believe that the Jus-
tice Department's conciliatory § 14141 strategy will prove more expedi-
tious than a litigation strategy; similarly, as will be discussed in the next
section, the two § 14141 decrees already entered appear comprehensive
and well administered. In order to assuage the concerns of affected
communities and advocacy groups, the Justice Department should con-
duct outreach to gather the opinions and interests of affected groups and
tailor consent decrees to reflect these opinions and interests where possi-
ble.
C. Equitable Relief- Current Department Strategy
Designing equitable relief that is appropriate and ameliorative may
be the Department's biggest challenge under § 14141. Structural injunc-
tions usually arise from problems for which our society has struggled for
decades to find answers. As a result, these problems' "[clauses may be
poorly understood; a technology for effectively dealing with them may
not exist; progress may be inherently difficult to measure. ,224 Such is
clearly the case with the problem of police misconduct?22 Designing insti-
tutional rules and procedures that deter and punish police misconduct,
but allow police the necessary discretion to control crime effectively has
proven an arduous task. The Steubenville and Pittsburgh cases represent
the Attorney General's first efforts at designing such institutional rules
221. See Cornwell, supra note 166, at 852-54. It should be noted that this criticism was lev-
eled at the Justice Department's strategy during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. There
is some reason to believe that the Department has expanded enforcement of CRIPA under the
Clinton Administration. See 3 No. 16 DOJ Alert 13, Dec. 6, 1993 ("[T]he division is expanding
enforcement under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act...").
222. See supra notes 165-171 and accompanying text.
223. In fact, Witold Walczak, Executive Director of the ACLU of Pittsburgh, whose class
action suit against the Pittsburgh Police Department included many of the victims of the pattern
of misconduct remedied by the Pittsburgh Consent Decree, described the Decree in glowing
terms: "I think it's a great day. This is the most far-reaching order governing any police depart-
ment in the United States." Pitz & Bull, supra note 213, at Cl. Walczak also noted, "The Justice
Department took our case and used their clout to get what we both wanted, which is meaningful
reform." Id.
224. ScHUcK, supra note 29, at 155.
225. Part of the difficulty stems from our society's sometimes conflicting desires that police
control and prevent crime quickly and effectively-using force when necessary-but that they
do so while adhering to rules and standards governing police conduct.
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and procedures. Though the decrees differ somewhat in their specifics,
their general approach and their framework are strikingly similar in na-
ture.
1. General Approach
The Justice Department's general approach appears to focus remedial
relief upon the implementation of particular policies rather than the at-
tainment of statistical goals. While the consent decrees each include one
paragraph enjoining the cities and police forces from further violations of
§ 14141,226 the entire remainder of each decree mandates the installation
of elaborate new police procedures-from new 'use of force' policies to
new complaint review procedures. Nothing in either decree specifically
requires the defendants to reduce the frequency of rights violations by
their police officers. Thus, in order to terminate the decrees, the defen-
dants must demonstrate not that they have reduced the number or fre-
quency of rights violations, but that they have in good faith installed and
implemented the required procedures.227
This focus on implementation of procedure, rather than elimination
of the underlying problem, represents a marked shift from the form of
prior structural injunctions. When compared to structural decrees and
injunctions in school desegregation cases-under which school districts
interested in terminating decrees must not only demonstrate implementa-
tion of integrative policies but also "that the purposes of the desegrega-
tion litigation ha[ve] been fully achieved," ' the shift in remedial focus is
patent.
In part, this shift results from the difficulty of measuring levels of po-
lice misconduct. In school desegregation cases, it is relatively easy to as-
certain the extent of the problem-comparisons of the number of minor-
ity students with the number of non-minority students in particular
schools will often suffice.229 Gathering and evaluating data regarding po-
lice misconduct is much more difficult. Available statistics, such as the
number of civil suits or citizen complaints, are poor predictors of the level
of police misconduct because of the numerous other variables that de-
226. Consent Decree 10, United States v. City of Steubenville, No. C2 97-966 (S.D. Ohio
filed Aug. 28, 1997); Consent Decree 1 10, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354
(W.D. Pa. filed Feb. 26,1997).
227. Consent Decree 96, City of Steubenville, No. C2 97-966; Consent Decree 79, City
of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354.
228. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,247 (1991).
229. This point is not intended to minimize the complicated nature of structural reform of
segregated school systems, but merely to point out that the problem in those cases is rarely in
measuring whether or not segregation exists.
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termine these figures.20 As a result, mandating procedural changes rather
than decreased misconduct enables courts and the plaintiff Department
of Justice to better measure compliance.
The shift also appears to represent a policy decision that pursuing en-
hanced procedures can increase the influence of each § 14141 suit. First,
in the individual case, obtaining improved procedures may prove more
effective over the long haul. The institutional nature of the changes
wrought by the consent decrees in Pittsburgh and Steubenville signifies
that, absent active steps to the contrary, the changed policies will remain
in effect after the consent decree has expired. Second, pursuing proce-
dural changes enables the Justice Department to develop a remedial
blueprint that, in principle, will apply equally to other police depart-
ments. Thus, while remedying a pattern of misconduct in Pittsburgh, the
Justice Department can also notify other municipalities interested in re-
ducing police misconduct and/or in avoiding § 14141 litigation as to what
policies the Department endorses. Through this strategy, the Department
can work to minimize misconduct in other police departments in addition
to those against which it brings § 14141 actions.
2. Framework
The Pittsburgh and Steubenville consent decrees contain enough
identical provisions to exhibit the framework of a reform model. The de-
crees provide for a replacement of each police department's use of
force,' 3' training,32 complaint review,233 and officer supervision policiese
with a new Justice Department model. In order to secure compliance, the
decrees each mandate the retention of an auditor to oversee the agree-
ment's implementation and report to the court regarding progress2 3s And
230. The number of civil suits is affected by the resources of victims, the types of police
misconduct, and the availability of legal representation. The number of civilian complaints is
determined by the type of complaint review procedure, community awareness of the review
procedure, the mechanism of complaint receipt, and community opinion regarding complaint
review effectiveness. The consent decrees' requirements that Pittsburgh and Steubenville es-
tablish more flexible complaint receipt policies and accept third party and anonymous com-
plaints will likely substantially increase the number of complaints. See Consent Decree 35-
36, 38, City of Steubenville, No. C2 97-96; Consent Decree 48, 50-51, City of Pittsburgh, No.
97-0354.
231. See Consent Decree 11 21-23, City of Steubenville, No. C2 97-966; Consent Decree 91
13, 15, & 18, City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354.
232. See Consent Decree 11 12-20, City of Steubenville, No. C2 97-966; Consent Decree
33-43, City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354.
233. See Consent Decree 28-63, City of Steubenville, No. C2 97-966; Consent Decree 91
44-69, City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354.
234. See Consent Decree 1% 64-78, City of Steubenville, No. C2 97-966; Consent Decree 91
12-30, City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354.
235. See Consent Decree 82-90, City of Steubenville, at C2 97-966; Consent Decree
70-76, City of Pittsburgh, at 97-0354.
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both decrees will remain in force for at least 5 years, at which time the
municipalities can move to terminate by demonstrating full and faithful
implementation of all provisions and substantial compliance for two
years.z3
While the two consent decrees share a common framework, they dif-
fer in important respects. These differences may result from a number of
factors. Different approaches are necessitated by the differences between
the two police departments in size and structure.237 The specifics of the
alleged pattern of rights violations may have triggered a particular focus
within the consent decree. In addition, the negotiated nature of consent
decrees and the differing objectives of each § 14141 defendant affected
the final product.2"
The Department of Justice will no doubt continue to develop its ap-
proach to reforming police departments under § 14141. With the assis-
tance of academic experts in the field of police policy, 3" the Department
of Justice developed the Pittsburgh and Steubenville consent decrees
through extensive analysis of the successes and failures of policies in dif-
ferent cities across America. 4 ' As experience and academic studies pro-
vide additional data regarding police policies, the Department will, no
doubt, adapt its framework to utilize successful new strategies.
D. A Potential Role for Community Groups?
Despite the law's limitation of standing to the Department of Justice,
the passage and implementation of § 14141 may present a new opportu-
nity for community and interest groups to pursue institutional police re-
form. As discussed above, the ACLU of Pittsburgh provided the De-
partment of Justice with evidence of 66 alleged incidents of police
misconduct compiled for the ACLU's own class action suit. Though the
city of Pittsburgh apparently rejected a Department of Justice suggestion
to include the ACLU in settlement negotiations of the § 14141 action, 4'
236. See Consent Decree 1 96, City of Steubenville, No. C2 97-966; Consent Decree at 79,
City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354.
237. For example, on account of the Pittsburgh Police Department's relatively large size
and budget, the Pittsburgh consent decree requires the installation of an "automated" early
warning system and a computerized database providing information on officers' behavioral his-
tories. See Consent Decree 12, City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354. On the other hand, because of
the relatively small size and budget of the Steubenville Police Department, the Justice Depart-
ment settled for a non-computerized information system. See Consent Decree 71, City of
Steubenville, No. C2 97-966.
238. Moossy Interview, supra note 164.
239. See, e.g., Consent Decree at App. 1, City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (affidavits of
James J. Fyfe, Ph.D, and Lou Reiter).
240. See Moossy Interview, supra note 164.
241. See Marylynne Pitz, City Sued To Pay Lawyer Fees in Police Suit, PITFSBURGH POST-
GAzETrE, Aug. 30,1997, at B2.
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the ACLU clearly felt that the resulting consent decree satisfied their
objectives. 42 Indeed, the ACLU subsequently claimed to be a prevailing
party and filed a petition for lawyers' fees for time spent compiling evi-
dence that led to the settlement.2 43 Whether other community and inter-
est groups can afford to imitate the ACLU's role in the Pittsburgh case
may depend largely on the disposition of this fee petition and others like
it.
In addition, community and interest groups may be able to use the
prospects of a § 14141 enforcement suit as a bargaining chip to increase
leverage regarding their own suits. For example, in Philadelphia, the local
ACLU and NAACP chapters and the Police-Barrio Project, a local La-
tino group favoring police reform, filed a class action suit on behalf of
victims of police misconduct seeking injunctive relief to establish effec-
tive training, supervision, and discipline policies.2" As discussed above,
Supreme Court precedent has virtually ruled out the possibility of the
suit actually obtaining injunctive relief.S However, the city of Philadel-
phia chose to settle the case with a consent decree that alters the police
department's complaint review process, installs an anti-corruption task
force, and reforms its Internal Affairs Division.24 The city's willingness to
settle a lawsuit in which it appeared to have a very strong case was surely
increased by the possibility of a subsequent § 14141 suit by the Justice
Department arising from the same facts.247
Because of the absence of private standing, any leverage gained by
community and interest groups from § 14141 will depend entirely upon
active enforcement of the statute by the Department of Justice. If the
threat of a § 14141 suit by the Justice Department is not a real one, mu-
nicipalities will return to their practice of litigating, and almost invariably
winning, private suits for injunctive relief against police misconduct. As a
result, the potential role for community and interest groups in § 14141
litigation is a tenuous one. However, if a proactive approach from the
Justice Department renders § 14141 litigation a common municipal con-
cern, community and interest groups could exert substantial new influ-
ence over police institutions. A symbiotic relationship between an active
242. See Pitz & Bull, supra note 213, at Cl.
243. See Pitz, supra note 241, at B2.
244. See Mark Fazlollah & Richard Jones, Suit Will Ask U.S. Court to Take Over City Po-
lice Reform, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 7, 1995, at Al.
245. See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text.
246. See Mark Fazlollah, Major Police Reforms Announced, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Sept. 5, 1996, at Al.
247. At the time, Philadelphia was reported as being on a short list of cities being consid-
ered by the Department of Justice for a full § 14141 investigation. See Curriden, supra note 148,
at 64.
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Justice Department and community groups with trickle-down leverage
could markedly increase the nationwide impact of § 14141.
IV. JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE REGARDING
STRUCTURAL LITIGATION: WHAT RECEPTION FOR § 14141?
The structural injunction-under which the judiciary reorganizes bu-
reaucratic structures to bring them into compliance with constitutional or
statutory requirements-is a relatively recent phenomenon. However,
within its short life span, the structural injunction has spawned substan-
tial academic criticism and, more recently, legislative and judicial cur-
tailment. As a result of this curtailment, both the Justice Department and
federal district court judges will have to tread carefully. As will be dis-
cussed below, structural injunctions and consent decrees will need to be
carefully tailored in order to satisfy recent Supreme Court precedent and
to avoid congressional backlash.
A. Civil Rights Structural Litigation
In 1955, in an effort to overcome the intractable opposition of state
bureaucracies to desegregating public school systems, the U.S. Supreme
Court authorized federal district courts to implement its decision in
Brown v. Board of Education by retaining jurisdiction over desegregation
cases and fashioning appropriate equitable remedies to ensure compli-
ance with constitutional principles.24 In order to achieve school desegre-
gation, the Brown II Court granted district courts the authority not only
to overhaul every aspect of educational administration, but also to revise
"local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the fore-
going problems."' 9 Thus was born what analysts termed the "structural
injunction"--defined by Professor Owen Fiss as a decree "through which
the judiciary seeks to reorganize ongoing bureaucratic organizations so as
to bring them into conformity with the Constitution. ''2s
The structural injunction quickly became an important tool in the ar-
senal of remedies employed by district courts in civil rights cases of all
types.2' Indeed, structural injunctions were soon entered in cases involv-
ing issues as diverse as electoral reapportionment, trade practices, and
248. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,300-01 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II].
249. Id. at 301. The power of federal district courts to force local and state governments to
revise laws and even raise taxes was recently upheld. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51
(1990) [hereinafter Jenkins 11] (overturning the district court's tax increase order as violating
the principles of comity, but holding that the district court could have ordered the school district
to raise taxes itself).
250. Owen Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOwA L. REV. 965,965 (1993).
251. For a discussion of the historical antecedents of the structural injunction, see OWEN
FIss, TsHE CIvIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1-6 (1978).
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environmental degradation."2 At one point during the 1970s, Chief Judge
Johnson of the Middle District of Alabama took control of the state's
school, prison, and mental health systems through structural injunctions
aimed at guaranteeing students and inmates constitutional treatment. 3
If courts in the 1960s and early '70s considered Brown II a decision of
"unquestioned correctness" 2 and structural injunctions a commonplace
remedy,'52 widespread use of the structural injunction spawned substan-
tial academic criticism in the late 1970s and early 1980s.25' Arguing that
unelected federal judges with little administrative experience are poor
managers of political and bureaucratic institutions, 7 these academics ad-
vocated a return to a traditional remedial hierarchy with equitable relief
available only in the extraordinary circumstance that no other remedy
will do the job.22
Perhaps in a nod to this conservative criticism, the Supreme Court es-
tablished guiding principles for district court injunctions, requiring that
"the nature of the violation determine[] the scope of the remedy" 29 and
that district courts "take into account the interests of state and local
authorities in managing their own affairs."' But the Court's general atti-
tude remained one of deference to district court decision-making: "[o]nce
a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad."25' As a result, struc-
tural civil rights injunctions proceeded apace. By 1994, for example, fed-
eral injunctions governed the confinement conditions of 244 prisons in
thirty-four jurisdictions and the administration of hundreds of school dis-
tricts.262 In some cases, these injunctions have remained in force for dec-
ades.63
252. See id. at 4.
253. See id.; Yoo, supra note 193, at 1124.
254. FISS, supra note 251, at 5.
255. See Yoo, supra note 193, at 1132.
256. See SCHUCK, supra note 29, at 150-81; RAOUL BERGER, GOvERNMENT BY JUDI-
CIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); LINO GRAGLIA,
DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND THE SCHOOLS (1976).
257. See Yoo, supra note 193, at 1123.
258. See Fiss, supra note 250, at 968-969.
259. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
260. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,281 (1977).
261. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
262. See Yoo, supra note 193, at 1124. In a particularly compelling example of the wide-
spread employment of structural injunctions, federal court orders played a role in the admini-
stration of the Corrections, Fire, Human Services, Education, Public Works, and Public Housing
departments of the government of the District of Columbia. See id.
263. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2042 (1995) [hereinafter Jenkins III];
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 240 (1991) ("This school desegregation litigation began
almost 30 years ago."); Fiss, supra note 154, at 1083 (acknowledging that because "our knowl-
edge of how to restructure on-going bureaucratic organizations is limited... courts must over-
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However, recent years have witnessed a backlash against the struc-
tural injunction not only in academic circles,26 but, more importantly, in
Congress and the Supreme Court. On the judicial level, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly upheld district court decisions to terminate struc-
tural injunctions that plaintiffs and many analysts felt had not yet
achieved their objectives.25 More recently in Jenkins III, the Court put
real teeth into previously nebulous limitations on structural injunctions,
overruling a seemingly typical desegregation order on the grounds that
the remedy was not sufficiently tailored to the constitutional violation.2"
Finally, in overturning a recent prison reform decree in Lewis v. Casey,
the Court questioned the very basis of structural injunctions, arguing that
"it is not the role of courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the
institutions of government in such fashion as to comply with the laws and
the Constitution.,
267
Meanwhile, less than two years after the passage of § 14141, Congress
enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, limiting the authority
of federal district courts to issue broad injunctive relief to remedy prison
conditions. Recently, bills have been introduced in the House and Sen-
ate to limit the authority of federal courts to enjoin the enforcement of
state laws and to raise taxes in order to comply with structural injunc-
tions.269 Given the anti-judicial philosophy of the current Republican
majority in Congress and the increase in the interaction of Congress and
the judiciary, further legislation limiting federal injunctive power is a dis-
tinct possibility.270 As Professor Fiss put it, in an article that preceded
many of these legal and political developments, the structural injunction
see and manage the remedial process for a long time-maybe forever").
264. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 193 (arguing that structural injunctions are beyond the power
granted to federal courts by the Constitution).
265. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992) (holding that the district court has the
authority to partially relinquish control of a school district before full compliance with constitu-
tional principles is achieved); Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
266. See Jenkins III, 115 S. Ct. at 2047-56 (overturning injunction aimed at desegregating
Kansas City schools by improving educational standards in order to attract non-minority stu-
dents from other school districts).
267. Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (1996). Without relying on the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's limitations on structural injunctions in the prison context, Lewis overturned an
injunction mandating a detailed legal library policy for Arizona prisons, in large part because
the district court "failed to give adequate consideration to the views of state prison authorities."
Id. at 2185.
268. Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII (1996). In granting prospective relief in suits over prison
conditions, district courts must satisfy a three-prong test: the remedy must be "narrowly drawn,"
"extend] no further than necessary to correct the violation," and be "the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation." Id. § 802(a) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (1994)).
269. See H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 32, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1817, 104th Cong.
(1996).
270. See Yoo, supra note 193, at 1176.
Vol. 17:149, 1998
Police Brutality





B. Likely Effects of Ambivalence Toward Structural Litigation
on § 14141
The development of these legal and political movements to curtail the
structural injunction raises interesting questions regarding the viability of
42 U.S.C. § 14141. Will courts prove reluctant to enter broad structural
injunctions aimed at reforming police bureaucracies for fear of reversal
by the Supreme Court? Or will courts not go the extra mile to implement
injunctions or consent decrees knowing that the Supreme Court will not
criticize inaction? Finally, if consent decrees or injunctions are enforced
proactively by federal courts, will active federal involvement in police
management offend the current conservative Congress enough to prompt
legislative curtailment of § 14141?
Whether courts will actively enforce injunctive relief under § 14141
will likely continue to depend on the individual district court. Though the
Supreme Court has begun to enforce limitations on structural injunc-
tions n and individual members of the Supreme Court have expressed
distaste for broad structural injunctions,273 district courts continue to ex-
ercise considerable discretion in fashioning institutional remedies to
counter institutional violations of constitutional rights. 274 So long as dis-
trict judges satisfy Jenkins III and Lewis by involving the local govern-
ment in designing equitable remedies and explaining the connection be-
tween violation and remedy, their ability to enforce injunctive relief will
likely remain broad.
Early returns suggest that the Department of Justice has already in-
corporated the limitations on structural injunctions in Jenkins III and
Lewis into its § 14141 enforcement strategy. On a strategic level, the deci-
sion to secure consent decrees rather than pursue litigation necessarily
involves state and local authorities in the drafting of equitable relief, ad-
dressing the Lewis Court's concerns regarding the involvement of local
governments. Moreover, a consent decree co-opts the municipality as a
remedial co-author, thus ensuring the decree itself against municipal
challenge.2"
271. Fiss, supra note 250, at 965.
272. See supra notes 259-260 & 265-267 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Jenkins III, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
274. See Yoo, supra note 193, at 1134-35 (acknowledging that limits on federal equitable
authority remain weak); Jenkins HI, 495 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1990) (authorizing district courts to en-
join state laws barring local officials from raising taxes).
275. The greatest danger to the consent decree is probably a challenge from police officers.
In the Pittsburgh case, the Fraternal Order of Police vehemently opposed the agreement and
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On a substantive level, the complaints and consent decrees in the
Pittsburgh and Steubenville cases appear to be drafted with the Courts'
limitations on injunctive relief in mind. No doubt aware of the Jenkins III
requirement that the remedy be carefully tailored to the constitutional
violation, the Department's complaints allege an underlying unconstitu-
tional action for almost every consent decree requirement276 And, most
likely in an effort to meet the Lewis requirement that injunctions allow
"administrators to exercise wide discretion within the bounds of constitu-
tional requirements," 2" the consent decrees leave substantial discretion in
the hands of local police administrators to operate within the decrees'
mandatory framework.278 As a result, even if the substance of the decrees
had been entered as injunctions and challenged by reluctant municipali-
ties, it seems likely that appellate courts would uphold such an order as
within the discretion of the district court.
Politically, it is clear that the current Republican Congress would not
pass a statute like § 14141, due to the ideological commitment of Con-
gress to the devolution of power from the federal government to states
and localities and its distrust for the federal judiciary.279 It is less clear
what it would take for Congress to change the status quo by repealing or
limiting federal authority to pursue injunctive relief under § 14141. The
force of inertia-a powerful force in current politics-favors the reten-
tion of § 14141. Most likely, it would take a substantial overreach by the
Department of Justice or by a federal judge to provide momentum for a
repeal or a limiting amendment. Given the current Department strategy
of pursuing consent decrees and preserving administrative flexibility,
such an overreach seems unlikely.
filed a motion to intervene. While U.S. District Judge Robert Cindrich denied the motion, he
held that the union could request hearings if it believed the decree had violated its contract with
the city or an officer's rights. See Pitz & Bull, supra note 213, at C1. Judge Cindrich has held at
least one such hearing to determine whether the city's new police contract conflicted with the
decree. See Marylynne Pitz, Settle Conflict, City and Police Told, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Feb. 20, 1998, at B1.
276. Compare, e.g., Complaint at I 11(a), United States v. City of Pittsburgh, 97-0354
(W.D. Pa. filed Feb. 26, 1997) (alleging failure to train officers adequately), with Consent De-
cree 33-43, City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (instituting new training procedures); Complaint
at 7, City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (alleging pattern or practice of excessive force), with
Consent Decree 13, 15, & 18, City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (instituting new use of force
policy and oversight procedures); Complaint at I 11(d), City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354
(alleging failure to investigate citizen complaints adequately), with Consent Decree 11 44-69,
City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (instituting new complaint review procedure).
277. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 363 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 833
(1977)).
278. See Moossy Interview, supra note 164.
279. See NEWr GINGRICH ET. AL, CONTRACT wHT AMERICA 49-51, 73 (Ed Gillespie &
Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (arguing for block grants and state and local flexibility in spending
federal dollars on crime prevention and welfare reform); John Aloysius Farrell, Republicans




Congressional passage of 42 U.S.C. § 14141 represents an important
step towards filling the vacuum left by the failure of criminal and civil law
regimes to control police misconduct. By authorizing the pursuit of in-
junctive relief, § 14141 provides the Justice Department with a new tool
to address systemic problems rather than scapegoating individual offi-
cers. Few analysts of police practices would argue with the proposition
that such a tool is badly needed. However, it remains an open question
whether § 14141 will develop into an effective weapon in the fight to re-
form police practices across the country, or simply become a last-resort
tool to clean up the worst American police departments.
The preceding analyses allow for a number of conclusions and policy
suggestions. First, on a judicial level, despite critics' concerns that the dif-
ficulties of proving a pattern or practice case will limit the statute's effec-
tiveness,2° § 14141 represents a workable and powerful tool. Though no
§ 14141 case has yet gone to trial, the statute's legislative history and ju-
dicial precedent in other "pattern or practice" cases suggest that proving
a § 14141 case would not represent an overly difficult task.21 By adopting
a broad, encompassing interpretation of "pattern or practice," federal
courts can advance the statute's overriding objective-to bring police de-
partments across America into compliance with federal law. Moreover,
by employing stricter review of § 14141 consent decrees and granting fee
petitions of community and advocacy groups that aid the Justice De-
partment, federal judges can ensure greater community involvement in
and increased effectiveness of § 14141.
Second, as a result of the deletion of individual standing, whether
§ 14141 will have a profound impact upon police practices across the na-
tion will depend upon its implementation by the Department of Justice.
The pursuit of negotiated consent decrees will likely enable the Justice
Department to avoid expensive courtroom litigation and to retain addi-
280. See Police Misconduct Hearings, supra note 38, at 64-65 (statement of Judge New-
man).
[T]he pattern or practice remedy... I think is a useful remedy, although I suspect it
will have limited success. It will always be difficult to prove a pattern and practice case.
There are, I think, some 7 or 8 statutes on the books now that authorize the U.S. to sue
to try to establish a pattern and practice of civil rights violations .... but my impres-
sion is very few cases have been brought and very few successes have been achieved.
Id.
281. To the contrary, § 14141's legislative history indicates that the Attorney General could
satisfy her burden of proof through evidence of a few individual rights violations and an institu-
tionalized police practice or policy condoning or contributing to police misconduct. See supra
notes 115-121 and accompanying text. Moreover, case law interpreting the phrase "pattern or
practice" in other civil rights statutes suggests that evidence of a large number of similar inci-
dents could prove sufficient to meet the burden of proving rights violations to be a regular prac-
tice of the defendant police department. See supra notes 124-140 and accompanying text.
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tional control over remedial solutions. Tactics such as employing consent
decree blueprints and integrating § 14141 actions with other Department
tools to fight police misconduct will help the Department make the most
of its resources.m However, such tactics may prove ineffective unless
Congress provides the Civil Rights Division with increased funding to
perform its increased responsibilities. Furthermore, the Department of
Justice must continue to make § 14141 enforcement a priority, regardless
of which political party controls the White House.
Effective implementation of § 14141 will require heightened aware-
ness of the current political and judicial climates regarding structural in-
junctions. The Justice Department and federal judges must craft injunc-
tive relief that satisfies the Supreme Court's limitations in Jenkins III and
Lewis. In order to avoid incurring the anger of the current Congress, the
Justice Department and federal courts should be sure to leave local insti-
tutions some flexibility in implementing equitable relief. The Depart-
ment's current strategy of pursuing consent decrees should go a long way
towards satisfying both of these objectives.
Finally, the potency of § 14141 as a solution to nationwide problems
of police misconduct will depend greatly upon the efficacy of the proce-
dural framework developed by the Justice Department and employed in
the Steubenville and Pittsburgh consent decrees.28 If the procedural re-
forms pursued by the Justice Department do not translate into improved
policing, then § 14141 may represent nothing more than a tool to alter
unconstitutional police policies and rein in the most offensive police de-
partments.
In the field of police misconduct, our society has yet to live up to
President Lincoln's admonition that it is "the duty of the Government to
render prompt justice against itself in favor of its citizens." 4 Traditional
criminal and civil damages regimes have failed to secure prompt justice.
By presenting a different legal paradigm in the form of civil equitable re-
lief, § 14141 represents a step in the right direction. How big a step re-
mains to be seen.
282. See supra notes 204-205 & 210-214 and accompanying text.
283. Engaging in policy analysis as to the effectiveness of the procedural reforms mandated
by the Steubenville and Pittsburgh consent decrees is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
the importance of policy success to the future of § 14141 cannot be ignored.
284. JACOBS, supra note 1, at vii.
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